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SUMMARY 
 
Ever since Siad Barre’s regime was toppled in the beginning of the 1990’s Somalia has been 
without an effective central government. As a result Somalia has remained in an anarchic 
condition of state collapse for nearly two decades. This anarchy has often been put forward 
as a potential breeding ground for terrorism. As a response to this threat the United States has 
undertaken several policies, initiatives, and operations in the Horn of Africa generally and in 
Somalia specifically. 
 
In this descriptive study a twofold analysis has been undertaken. First, conditions in present 
day Somalia as well as Somali history have been analyzed to evaluate the potential Somalia 
holds as a terrorist base of operations or a recruiting- or staging area. Second, US strategies 
and actions have been analyzed to evaluate the adequacy of the US response to the threat 
Somalia poses in terms of terrorism. 
 
Material for the analyses have been derived from anthropological, political, and security 
studies dealing with Somalia. This material has been augmented by a wide range of news 
coverage, western and non-western. Certain different US policy documents from different 
levels have been chosen to represent US strategies for the Global War on Terrorism.  
 
Because Somali social institutions, such as the clan system, hold great weight in Somali 
society, Somalia is a difficult area of operations for terrorist networks. In addition the 
changing nature of Somali alliances and the tangled webs of conflict that characterize present 
day Somalia aggravate the difficulties that foreign terrorist networks would encounter in 
Somalia, would they choose to try to utilize it in any great extent. 
 
  
The US has taken potential terrorism threats in Africa and specifically Somalia very 
seriously. US actions in Somalia have mainly focused on apprehending or neutralizing terror 
suspects. Such policies, coupled with backing the Ethiopian invasion of Somalia may have 
actually turned out increasing Somalia’s terror potential. 
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Glossary 
 
AIAI Al-Ittihad Al-Islamiyya (al-Itihaad al-Islaami)  
AFIS Amministrazione Fiduciaria Italiana della Somalia  
(Italian Trusteeship Administration) 
AFRICOM US African Command 
ALS Alliance for the Liberation of Somalia 
AOR area of responsibility 
ASWJ Ahlu Sunna wal Jama’a 
EUCOM  US European Command 
CENTCOM US Central Command 
CJTF-HOA The Combined Joint Task Force–Horn of Africa 
CTF-150 Commander Task Force – 150 
DoD United States Department of Defense  
GCC geographic combatant command 
GWOT Global War on Terror 
HDM Hisbia Digil Mirifle 
ICU The Islamic Courts Union  
JFCOM US Joint Forces Command 
JP1 Joint Publication 1 – Doctrine for the Armed Forces of the United States 
JP 3-07.2 Joint Publication 3-07.2 - Joint Tactics, Techniques, and Procedures for 
Antiterrorism 
MOD Marehan, Ogaden, and Dolbahante, three Daarood sub-clans 
NDS The National Defense Strategy of The United States of America 
NGO Non-governmental organization 
NMS The National Military Strategy of the United States of America  
NMSP-WOT The National Military Strategic Plan for the War on Terrorism 
NORTHCOM  US Northern Command 
NSCT The National Strategy for Combating Terrorism 
NSS National Security Service (of Somalia) 
NSS  The National Security Strategy of the United States of America 
NUF National United Front 
PACOM US Pacific Command 
PMC Private military company 
QRD Quadrennial Defense Review Report 
SDA Somali Democratic Alliance  
2 
SOUTHCOM US Southern Command 
SNC Somali National Congress 
SNF Somali National Front 
SNL Somali National League 
SNM Somali National Movement 
SOCOM US Special Operations Command  
SPM Somali Patriotic Movement  
SRC Supreme Revolutionary Council 
SRSP Somali Revolutionary Socialist Party 
SSDF Somali Salvation Democratic Front 
STRATCOM US Strategic Command 
SYC Somali Youth Club 
SYL Somali Youth League  
TC Territorial Council 
TFG Transitional Federal Government (of Somalia) 
TNG Transitional National Government (of Somalia) 
TRANSCOM US Transportation Command  
ICU Islamic Court Union, also Union of Islamic Courts (UIC) 
UN United Nations 
UNITAF Unified Task Force 
UNOSOM United Nations Operation in Somalia 
UNSC United Nations Security Council 
USC United Somali Congress 
USP United Somali Party 
USRDF US Rapid Deployment Force 
USSR Union of Soviet Socialist Republics, The Soviet Union 
WSLF Western Somali Liberation Front 
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THE GLOBAL WAR ON TERRORISM IN THE HORN OF AFRICA 
 
 
“Why is Africa important to the United States? …Because it’s there.”1 
 
-  James Woods, Former Deputy Assistant 
Secretary of Defense for African Affairs 
 
1. Introduction  
 
On September 11th 2001 three hijacked aircraft, American Airlines Flight 11, United Airlines 
Flight 175, and American Airlines Flight 77, crashed into their targets.  United Airlines Flight 
93 was unable to strike its target as the hijackers crashed the plane to the ground, when the 
passengers were about to overcome the them. Not counting the terrorists, 2973 people died in 
the September 11th attacks. Strategically thinking, the unthinkable had happened. “A small 
group of terrorists operating out of an undeveloped country in Central Asia…”   had inflicted 
“…more damage on the U.S. in a few hours than the entire Japanese Imperial Navy did at 
Pearl Harbour…”.2 
 
The US response to the devastating 9/11-attacks was swift. A Global War on Terror (GWOT) 
was declared, and military operations commenced in several different theaters, most notably 
Operation Enduring Freedom in Afghanistan. Being a failed state, Somalia was sighted as a 
potential terrorist safe haven, and intelligence- and other operations were stepped up or 
initiated. At the time of writing, several counterterrorism operations were underway.  
 
However, Somalia’s potential as a terrorist base or safe haven is not necessarily that great. In 
fact, Somalia is a rather challenging environment for terrorist networks. Below I shall analyze 
                                                 
1
  Whelan, Theresa: Why AFRICOM? In  The Royal United Services Institute (RUSI); The African Military 
in the 21st Century. RUSI, Whitehall Report 4-07. London 2007, 61 (Whelan 2007). 
2
  Whelan 2007, 63; For a thorough look at the 9/11-attacks, see The 9/11 Commission Report available at 
<http://govinfo.library.unt.edu/911/report/index.htm>. 
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Somali history, social mechanisms and Somali Islamism to evaluate Somalia’s terrorist 
potential. 
 
I will analyze several different US policy documents to gain a comprehensive picture of the 
policies behind US counter-terrorism strategies. These strategies will then be contrasted with 
the actions the United States has undertaken in Somalia. This analysis will make it possible to 
try to answer the main research problem, is the US response adequate to the threat Somalia 
poses in terms of radical Islamic terror? 
 
Why is it necessary to study Somalia and the GWOT? In addition to being a contemporary 
subjects of strategic importance, Somalia and the GWOT are both subjects which the 
understanding of offers a Finnish audience additional benefits. First, the GWOT and US 
policies justified by terrorism have caused a lot of bad blood between the US and its European 
partners. Europeans, and Finns among them, frequently find it hard to understand the 
American worldview when it comes to combating terrorism. Hopefully studying to the 
strategies behind the GWOT will alleviate this problem. Second, African social institutions, 
such as clans and African variations of Islam, remain an enigma to many western soldiers 
taking part in operations on the continent. With this in mind, it is easy to see that any exercise 
in understanding said institutions may prove useful, especially since Africa is often mentioned 
as a potential deployment area for the EU Battlegroups. In addition, recent developments have 
reminded Finns that we live in a globalized world in which terrorism can touch any country3.  
 
1.1 Previous Research and Sources 
 
To date, only two theses concerning Somalia have been published in the last 20 years in the 
National Defense University4. Internationally there does however exist actual research on the 
role of Somalia in the GWOT. What has been published consists mainly of pamphlets5 and 
articles in international journals6, although there are some published volumes. Articles dealing 
                                                 
3
  Helsingin Sanomat (HS): Suomen Kenian-lähetystöä varoitettiin terrori-iskusta. HS. February 7th 2008. 
4
 According to TAISTO-database: Saariaho, Mikko: Yhdistyneiden Kansakuntien rauhanturvaoperaatio 
Somaliassa vuosina 1992-1995. National Defense University, Helsinki 2003, Bachelor of Military Sciences 
theses, SK112;  Huovinen, Petri: Yhdysvaltain Somalian operaatiot sotilaallisina suorituksina ja niistä 
saadut kokemukset. National Defense University , Helsinki 2000, Cadet graduate theses K 456. Both of said 
theses address the United Nations UNSOM-operation in Somalia in the early 1990’s, and practically do not 
deal with terrorism or GWOT as such. 
5
 For example: Menkhaus, Ken: Somalia : State collapse and the threat of terrorism. The International 
Institute for Strategic Studies (IISS), Adelphi paper 364, London 2004 (Menkhaus 2004). 
6
 For example: Prendergast, John – Thomas-Jensen, Coli: Blowing the Horn, Washington’s Failings in 
Africa. Foreign Affairs vol. 86, March/April 2007 (Prendergast - Thomas-Jensen 2007). 
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with failed or collapsed states in general are legion7. General background information on 
Africa is also in abundance8. In addition, a lot of material has been published concerning the 
UNSOM-operations, the US intervention (Operation Restore Hope), and the “Black Hawk 
Down”-incident9. 
 
In summary, material on Somalia is seemingly endless. This is especially the case when it 
comes to the clan system, state failure and collapse, civil war, and “warlordism”. It is without 
doubt that one can conclude, even after a superficial reference study, that the primus inter 
pares of Somalia scholars is Professor Ioan M. Lewis. He is widely considered the foremost 
authority on Somalia, specifically the clan system and Somali society. His first works on 
Somalia date back five decades, and altogether include a detailed history, anthropological 
research and contemporary analysis.  
 
Works focusing on the very subject of the GWOT and terrorism in Somalia do also exist. 
Bjørn Møller has produced a work titled The Horn of Africa and the US “War on Terror” 
with a Special Focus on Somalia, and reached very similar results. An excellent account on 
al-Qaida’s endeavours, and problems, in Somalia can be found in a West Point study titled Al-
Qaida’s (Mis)Adventures in the Horn of Africa10.   
 
International news coverage concerning Somalia is extensive. Networks such as the BBC and 
CNN and newspapers such as the International Herald Tribune or the New York Times cover 
Somalia and the Grater Horn region in detail. Western news networks though, pose two 
problems. First, they address the subject in very general terms, and catchphrases, such as 
failed states, terrorism, “clanism”, and so forth are used without much consideration to their 
deeper meanings. Second, they are mostly western in origin and in outlook. Controversial 
issues, such as the nature of the GWOT are mainly treated from a rather western viewpoint. 
Also, the colonial past is bound to have an impact on the way in which East Africa is 
portrayed. 
                                                 
7
 For example: Hamre, John – Sullivan, Gordon: Toward Postconflict Reconstruction.  The Washington 
Quarterly vol. 25, Autumn 2002. 
8
 For example: Nugent, Paul: Africa since Independence. Palgrave Macmillan, Houndsmill, Basingstoke, 
Hampshire, and New York 2004 (Nugent 2004);  Kieh, George – Mukenge, Ida: Zones of conflict in Africa 
: theories and cases. Westport, Conn. & London, 2002. 
9
 For example: Stevenson, Jonathan: Losing Mogadishu – Testing U.S. Policy in Somalia. Shrewsbury, Salop 
& Annapolis, Md , 1995 (Stevenson 1995); Eversmann, Matt – Schilling, Dan: The Battle of Mogadishu. 
Presidio Press, New York 2006 (Paperback, Mass Market Edition). 
10
  Møller, Bjørn: The Horn of Africa and the US “War on Terror” with a Special Focus on Somalia. 
Conference paper by Bjørn Møller, July 31st 2007. Preliminary version quoted with permission from the 
author (Møller 2007); Combating Terrorism Center CTC: Al-Qa’ida’s (Mis)Adventures in the Horn of 
Africa. Harmony Project, Combating Terrorism Center at West Point., 2007, 29-45 et passim (CTC 2007).  
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Thus, African or non-western news services provide a useful alternative reference.  These are 
mostly online news services, or online versions of traditional newspapers, such as AllAfrica11, 
Shabelle Media Network12, Somaliland Times13 or news services provided by 
nongovernmental organizations (NGOs) such as Somaliawatch14. Also the Middle-Eastern 
media service par excellence, Al Jazeera15 must not be forgotten. African and non-western 
media services suffer from similar shortcomings as their western counterparts: Selective 
reporting, politically opinionated writing, influence by different political interest groups, and 
so forth. In addition African media sources may also be physically threatened by those whom 
they report on, which clearly places strains on neutral and truthful journalism. None the less, 
used with caution they are useful sources which often cover events or background issues 
overlooked by western media. 
 
1.2 Notes on language and terminology 
 
I have chosen to write this study in English. For this there are two reasons. First, most of the 
subject material is in English. As the United States is a central element in this study English is 
a practical choice. Second, writing in English increases the possibility of utilizing elements of 
this study in the future, and gaining a wider audience. Writing in English does, however hold 
one downside. As mentioned above English language material on the subject is readily 
available, Finnish language material is not. A Finnish summary is provided at the end of this 
paper. 
 
Certain terms concerning African studies, and especially the study of terrorism are often used 
rather liberally in different sources. Because of this, below I will offer the definitions used 
here. Many of the definitions, especially those concerning Islam are not precise, because 
different fields of study define some terms differently. Below I have attempted to adopt the 
definitions and connotations which are most commonly used.   
 
Failed state or collapsed state 
“Failed state” and “Collapsed State” are both terms which are frequently used rather lightly in 
contemporary media. Robert D. Kaplan, in his often quoted, but not always agreed with, 
                                                 
11
  Provided by AllAfrica Global Media, available at <www.allafrica.com>. 
12
  Available at <http://www.shabelle.net/news/english.htm>. 
13
  Somaliland times is a English language newspaper  published by Haatuf Media Network based in 
Hargeysa, Somaliland. Its online version is available at < http://somalilandtimes.net/>. 
14
  Available at <http://www.somaliawatch.com/>. 
15
  Available at <http://english.aljazeera.net/English>. 
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depiction of the future “The Coming Anarchy” predicts that “...the classificatory grid of 
nation-states is going to be replaced by a jagged-glass pattern of city-states, shanty-states, 
nebulous and anarchic regionalisms...”16. Kaplan’s bleak description fits perfectly to what is 
generally understood to be meant with the term “failed state”. According to Russett, Starr, and 
Kinsella failed states are ”...states that are internationally recognized, but whose governments 
(if they exist) cannot provide their citizens with even the minimum level of security and well-
being expected of sovereign states”17. Jackson and Sorensen claim failed states to be the result 
of “...more or less complete breakdown of domestic order...”18. The two definitions sighted 
above are rather broad and all-encompassing, but useful as such, and will be adhered to in this 
paper, as they accurately describe the situation in many parts of Somalia. 
 
Clan 
The Somali clans system is presented later in detail. Here it suffices to say that in the text the 
term “clan” is used liberally to describe any faction or group which the identity of is based on 
the clan system. This regardless of whether the assembly being discussed is in actuality a 
clan-family, a tribe, a lineage, a clan or sub-clan. The term however does not apply to such 
political groups as Al-Ittihad Al-Islamiyya (AIAI), Islamic Courts Union19 or the Somali 
National Movement (SNM). Groups such as these or parts of them may mostly draw their 
support from a specific clan, but will be referred to by their specific names.   
 
The Greater Horn Region or Greater Horn 
Here “the Greater Horn Region is understood to mean a region encompassing seven states; 
Sudan, Eritrea, Ethiopia, Djibouti, Somalia, Kenya, and Uganda. Thus the Greater Horn forms 
a region half the size of the United States.20  
 
Horn of Africa or Horn 
Here “Horn of Africa” will be used to refer to the peninsula which extends northeastern 
Africa hundreds of kilometers into the Arabian Sea, forming the Gulf of Aden between itself 
and the south coast of Yemen. Here Horn of Africa refers only to the geographical area, not 
the land area of any given state. If used to refer to states, “Horn of Africa” is understood here 
to mean only Somalia. 
                                                 
16
 Kaplan, Robert: The Coming Anarchy. The Atlantic Monthly, vol. 273, no. 2,February 1994, 72.  
17
 Russett, Bruce – Starr, Harvey – Kinsella, David: World Politics. The Menu for Choice (7th edition). 
Wadswoth / Thomson Learning, Belmont CA 2004, 216 (Russett – Starr – Kinsella 2004). 
18
 Jackson, Robert – Sorensen, Georg: Introduction to international relations (2nd edition). Oxford University 
Press, Oxford and New York 2003, 284 (Jackson – Sorensen 2003). 
19
 Several different spellings appear. This on is the most common in western medias. In English either The 
Islamic Courts Union  (ICU) or The Union of Islamic Courts (UIC). 
20
 Prendergast  – Thomas-Jensen 2007, 59. 
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Somalia 
“Somalia” refers to the Somali Republic and Somali Democratic Republic i.e. the state of 
Somalia. When used in such historical or modern context that no state of Somalia can be said 
to exist, “Somalia” is used to refer to the general land area of Somalia. 
 
Somali and Somalian 
Below, “Somali” is used to refer to ethnic background, and identity as a member of the 
Somali people. “Somalian” specifically refers to official nationality as pertaining to the 
Somali state. Thus a Somali might not be Somalian and vice versa. 
 
Terrorism 
The US Code of January 19th 2004 divides terrorism into domestic and international: “...the 
term “international terrorism” means activities that are a violation of the criminal laws of the 
United States or of any State, or that would be a criminal violation if committed within the 
jurisdiction of the United States or of any State; (B) appear to be intended (i) to intimidate or 
coerce a civilian population; (ii) to influence the policy of a government by intimidation or 
coercion; or (iii) to affect the conduct of a government by mass destruction, assassination, or 
kidnapping; and (C) occur primarily outside the territorial jurisdiction of the United States, 
or transcend national boundaries in terms of the means by which they are accomplished, the 
persons they appear intended to intimidate or coerce, or the locale in which their 
perpetrators operate or seek asylum...”. According to the US Code domestic terrorism 
deviates from international terrorism only in the fact that it “occur[s] primarily within the 
territorial jurisdiction of the United States.”21 Terrorism is of course an extremely 
controversial issue, for which the United Nations has, as of fall 2007, been unable to find a 
definition for.22  
 
Islam and Islamic 
Here Islamic is used to refer to anything pertaining to Islam. Islamic is thus used as a 
adjective for anything related to the religion of Islam, and is not to be confused with 
“Islamist”.  
                                                 
21
 United States Code as of  January 19th 2004, Title 18: Crimes and Criminal Procedure, Part 1: Crimes, 
Chapter 113B: Terrorism, Section 2331, Definitions. Available at  
 < http://www.law.cornell.edu/uscode/uscode18/usc_sec_18_00002331----000-.html >. 
22
 Puistola, Juha-Antero: Terrorismi. In Kerttunen, Mika: Uudet uhkat? Publications 2, no. 37,Department of 
Strategic and Defence Studies, National Defence University, Helsinki 2007, 67-69. For more information 
on definitions of terrorism see Martin, Gus: Understanding Terrorism,Challenges, Perspectives, and Issues. 
Sage Publications, Thhousand Oaks, London and New Delhi 2003, 22-48. 
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Islamism and political Islam.  
An Islamist movement is one in which political institutions, legislation, and government are 
derived from Islam. Islamists understand Islam to be not only a religion, but also a political 
identity. Islamism is a general term for all forms of political Islam, irregardless of what 
Islamic sect any form of political Islam represents.23 
 
Jihadism, Salafism,and  Wahhabism 
Jihadism is here used to refer to any ideology or movement which teaches the use of physical 
violence as a means to attain political, usually Islamist, aims. Salafism and Islamism  are both 
Islamic movements, albeit, with different ideological viewpoints. Wahhabism, derived from 
the teachings of 18th century Islamic teacher Muhammad ibn Abdalwahháb, stresses the 
purification of Islam from foreign influences. Salafism on the other hand, at least in its 
original form, preaches the need to modernize, purify, and revitalize Islam. Or rather, Islam 
should make use of, and learn western technological and scientific advances, and thus 
eventually surpass the west. To date, Wahhabism and Salafism have, to some extent, merged 
and incorporated elements of each other. Both schools of thought are heterogeneous 
collections of different factions and vary regionally.24  
                                                 
23
  For a thorough discussion on Islamism see Jokinen, Christian – Kullberg, Anssi: Separatismi ja Islamismi. 
Kustannus Oy Suomen Mies. Jyväskylä 2006, 38-63. 
24
  Ibid. 
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2. Research paradigm and theoretical background  
 
2.1 Research questions and research paradigm 
 
This thesis I aim to study two countries; the United States on the other hand, and Somalia on 
the other. Certain narrow elements of both countries are evaluated and findings concerning 
one are used as a tool to evaluate findings concerning the other. The aim of this research is to 
evaluate the threat Somalia poses to US national security and US interests in the region via 
terrorism. Once this is done, assess the US response to said threat and evaluate the adequacy 
of this response. To put it shortly, this research is essentially meant to be about Somalia and 
US anti-terror policies and action toward, in, and against Somalia. Somalia is in effect used as 
a backdrop for studying the War on Terror. 
 
This research does not aim to be a country profile of Somalia or a regional overview. 
However, a very specific objective is to gain cultural understanding of Somali culture and 
insight into the social mechanisms at work inside Somali society. The very history of recent 
US military operations, mainly the UNOSOMs, bare solemn testimony to the importance of 
cultural awareness. 
 
Terrorism is not in itself a subject of this study. Several studies have been written on terrorism 
theory, and it remains a highly debated and controversial subject. Many such studies have 
been published which are more or less objective, and possessing of a broad world view. 
Unfortunately, for each good study published, a politicized study has be published as well. 
These studies are opinionated strongly in one direction or the other, and can hardly be seen as 
useful material for a student of the military sciences. This is of course not surprising as 
terrorism is a multi-faceted phenomenon which has even eluded definition. One man’s 
freedom fighter is indeed the other man’s terrorist. 
 
11 
Diagram 1: Research Paradigm 
 
 
 
As is depicted in diagram 1, Somalia is a subject of study in its own right, as well as a 
“looking glass” through which the GWOT can be, viewed, analyzed, and evaluated. The 
GWOT is looked at through, and compared with, Somalia. In addition it is evaluated 
internally by comparing theory and practice, policies and actions. Naturally it is clear that any 
one of the sectors in diagram 1 could easily fill several shelves worth of studies. Thus this 
study is by necessity an overview. 
 
Despite its title this thesis is not a military history of US anti-terror operations in Somalia. 
This would be simultaneously well nigh impossible and impractical. Since the brunt of US 
operations has been covert in nature, few sources exist, and the ones that do are highly 
unreliable.  This is not to claim that sources do not exist - they do - just that they are mostly 
highly unreliable.  
 
Social 
mechanisms 
Islam 
History 
Conflict 
Clan system 
Civil war 
Global War 
on Terror 
   Theory 
 Practice 
REACTION 
Islamism 
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2.2 Research questions 
 
The main research question is: 
 
Is the US response adequate to the threat Somalia poses in terms of radical Islamic terror?  
 
This main question is broken down into secondary-questions, and these in turn are divided 
into tertiary questions in the following manner: 
 
1. Does Somalia hold potential as a terrorist base of operations or a recruiting- or staging 
area? What is the extent of this threat? 
 
1.1  What general trends can be detected in the history of Somalia concerning 
the social mechanics pertaining to armed groups and political Islam? 
 
1.2 What is the role and potential of radical Islam in Somali society? 
 
2. What is the general strategy for the Global War on Terror, and how does Somalia fit into 
its paradigm? 
 
2.1  What general actions has the US taken in Somalia and the Greater Horn 
region in terms of the war on terror? 
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2.3 Theoretical approach 
 
Of all the theoretical schools of thought prevailing in modern strategic studies and the study 
of International Relations (IR), Political Realism seems, in spite of its many shortcomings, 
best suited to dealing with problems pertaining to the study of terrorism and anti-terrorism. Of 
course, realism is hardly the only discipline suited for the task. Liberalism, constructivism, 
neoliberalism, international political economy, thoughts of the English school, as well as 
other theoretical approaches also hold great potential as tools in studying terrorism and anti-
terrorism.  However, for the time being, realism would seem to be most useful and thus I have 
adopted it as the approach to use. 
 
The reasons for making this choice are rather simple. First, realism readily offers an 
explanation for the actions states take, especially those involving the use of military power 
outside their own borders. Thus, if we accept that the Global War on Terrorism is not just 
about the war on terrorism, but also about power politics, realism readily offers valid 
explanations. Second, many non-state actors in Somalia, clans, sub-clans, autonomous 
regions, clan-based militias, and the like seem to behave as if they were states within a state. 
Therefore, realism also helps explain their actions. In addition, the main goal of many such 
groups is security. If one were to view said groups as organizations seeking to provide 
security within themselves, as well as from outside aggression, the analogy to states seems 
justified. Below I shall briefly discuss the fundamentals of realism that are paramount for this 
study. I will also attempt to justify the  use of a rather state centered theory to explain the 
actions of numerous non-state actors within a country that can hardly be seen as a functioning 
member of the international system. 
 
2.3.1 Political Realism 
 
Often described in such terms as “…one of the dominant forces guiding international relations 
theory…”25 realism is without doubt one of, if not the most influential theory in the study of 
International Relations.26  
 
In his classic work Politics Among Nations Hans Morgenthau outlines the basic principles of 
Political Realism. These can be summarized into six basic principles. First, politics is 
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governed by a set of rules that are brought forth by human nature itself, and thus have 
remained unchanged throughout time.  Second, Political Realism identifies as its main 
concept the concept of “interest defined in terms of power”. That is to say that the essence of 
politics is power. This distinguishes politics from other spheres of action, such as economics, 
which is understood “in terms of interest defined as wealth”. Third, interest defined in terms 
of power is universally valid, while at the same time not being unchanged and immune to 
prevailing circumstances. In other words the content and use of power are subordinate to 
political and cultural environments. Fourth, Political Realism is “aware of the moral 
significance of political action”, while at the same time though it holds that the state has no 
right to subordinate its actions to moral considerations because of its citizens who rely on it to 
look after their security. Fifth, realism strictly separates moral aspirations of states and the 
moral laws by which the universe operates. Sixth, the demands of other spheres of life can not 
be allowed to dictate political actions. As such economic or legal objectives cannot be 
allowed to form the basis for political action; they should be decided upon through interest 
defined in terms of power. These six principles can be seen to form the foundation of the 
realist view of international relations.27 
 
Thus, the fundamental element in classical Political Realism is power. Power however, is 
mostly not just an end in itself, but a means to achieve a very fundamental goal. This goal is 
security. Security can only be achieved by gaining sufficient power to counter the political 
dictates of other actors. This is true for all levels of political action, from individuals to entire 
states. Thomas Hobbes, in his famous “Leviathan” vividly describes this state of matters: 
“...during the time men live without a common Power to keep them all in awe, they are in that 
condition which is called Warre; and such a warre, as is of every man, against every man.”28 
Individuals however, have been freed from this need to constantly seek more power by the 
formation of the state.  This is because the state upholds law and order within, thus 
transforming an all-out war of everyone against everyone into peaceful society.29  
 
States on the other hand are not so lucky. No supreme authority exists above states, and they 
are thus forced to deal with each other in a world of international anarchy. In short, a “state of 
warre” still exists between them. Thus states are forced to constantly seek more power to 
ensure national security i.e. state survival. This mechanism of power however, turns the 
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international system into a zero-sum game, a situation in which one side’s gain is 
automatically the other side’s loss. If one state were to gain a great amount of power, its 
neighbors would perceive this as a threat to their security, and be forced to seek more power 
themselves. In such a system, for states, national security is always their first and foremost 
concern. Because of this, states can never truly trust each other. All international agreements 
and accords are normally respected, but can be discarded instantly if they come into conflict 
with national security.30 
 
This mutual distrust and the zero-sum nature of the international system bring forth a logical 
and political problem, referred to as the security dilemma. Shortly put the security dilemma 
arises when all states seek the key to security, i.e. power. As some states acquire more and 
more power (undoubtedly feeling more and more secure) they simultaneously begin to be 
perceived as threats by other states. These states then begin to respond in turn, and a vicious 
circle of armament competition ensues. As a result, whatever steps a state takes to increase its 
security may, in the end, make it less secure. This is the very essence of the security dilemma. 
It is noteworthy that what matters is how states perceive each other and how secure or 
insecure they feel, not how secure or insecure they de facto are. This subjectivity also goes for 
calculations of power and evaluations concerning military power: what seems sufficient for 
the defense of one state may be perceived as threatening attack preparations by that state’s 
neighbors.31  
 
The key to breaking out of the security dilemma is cooperation. Cooperation between states 
is, especially in volatile complex regional issues, extremely difficult. This is, because one 
state “cheating” may undermine the security of other states. Because all states fear betrayal 
and state survival is their prime concern, they tread carefully when it comes to cooperation. 
This is often the case, even when cooperation would hold greater benefits than going it alone. 
This problem is also an old IR classic, known commonly as the prisoners’ dilemma. The 
prisoners’ dilemma is a widespread concept which has been used to explain the Cold War 
arms race, as well as other phenomenon.32 
 
The prisoners’ dilemma is a game-theoretical concept that manages to capture the main 
problem of the security dilemma. The prisoner’s dilemma describes two felons (A and B) who 
are caught and held by the police in separate interrogation facilities, unable to communicate. 
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The district attorney offers both the prisoners the same options: testify against his partner in 
crime or remain silent. The district attorney informs the prisoners that if one of the prisoners 
testifies, but the other does not, the one who testified will go free, and the one who did not 
will be convicted to ten years in prison.  If both testify against each other, both will be 
convicted more leniently, to seven years in prison. If both remain silent, the court will, due to 
lack of evidence, be unable to convict either on major transgressions, and thus both will 
receive only one year in prison. If both prisoners could trust the other not to betray him, both 
could remain silent and receive only the minimum punishment. However, since the prisoners 
cannot trust each other, just as states or competing political groups cannot, the only logical 
choice is to testify against the other. Let us consider prisoner A’s options: If B does not 
testify, A’s best option is to testify since then he will receive no punishment as opposed to one 
year if he would not testify. If B does testify, testifying against him remains A’s best choice, 
since the he will receive seven years instead on ten. Seven years in more than one, but 
considerably less than the ten he will receive if he trusts B and that trust is betrayed. As we 
can see A’s best option is to testify against B, no matter what. Naturally B will follow the 
same logic, and both prisoners will receive seven years in stead of the one year they could 
have gotten away with, had they cooperated.33 In essence “A prisoners’ dilemma is a situation 
where the behavior that is rational for the entire group is irrational from the perspective of 
each individual in the group.”34  
 
Barry Posen argues that in situations of state collapse the problem inherent in the security 
dilemma is aggravated by two factors, namely the similarity of offensive and defensive 
preparations and the perceived greater effectiveness of offensive action. Groups emerging 
from state collapse, who find themselves suddenly responsible for their own security, are 
usually forced to arm themselves for fear of violent actions by other groups. Usually to such 
groups, only low-tech weapons are readily available. As a result these groups are mainly able 
to form militia-based infantry armies, which while understood to suit defensive operations 
better than offensive ones, can also be used for attacking enemy territory. If these groups are 
able to commandeer heavier weapons, like armor or artillery, the same problem persists; 
armor for example may be excellent offensive weaponry, but it is also very effective in 
defense. This is also true generally for military potential, it can be used for defensive as well 
as offensive warfare. Thus states or other groups cannot completely judge their neighbors 
intentions, and are forced to assume and prepare for the worst, because the worst is possible. 
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It is also important to note that in circumstances put forth by state collapse, the strength of any 
group’s group identity is an important factor whilst calculating offensive capability.35 I 
 
As mentioned, superiority of offensive action over defensive action may also deepen the 
security dilemma. In a situation of state collapse, two factors in particular may bee seen to 
affect the superiority of the offensive over the defensive. The first factor is technology. As 
technology and military hardware are more or less a constant and Somalia is void of nuclear 
weapons, technology need not be examined further. The second factor is political and ethnic 
geography. Political and ethnic geography may form incentives for aggressive action: Some 
groups will be completely encircled by others. Other groups may be tempted to initiate an 
attack to rescue pockets of friendly populace within enemy territory, and so forth. Sadly, but 
not surprisingly, the behavior of international organizations, including the relief organizations 
and the UN, may also make offensive action a tempting option.36  
 
In Posen’s words: “…the military capability of groups will often be dependent on their 
cohesion, rather than their meager military assets. This cohesion is a threat in its own right 
because it can provide the emotional power for infantry armies to take the offensive.” Strong 
group identity and group cohesion are paramount in forging infantry militias into effective 
and efficient fighting forces and thus a necessary defensive precaution. In addition, 
strengthening group cohesion may be vital for group survival or formation, especially if the 
group is a new one. Because of this, neighboring groups will, in addition to arming 
physically, also begin to arm psychologically. This psychological arms race will include a 
host of political rhetoric as well as propaganda operations.  Unfortunately this ideological 
armament follows the general mechanism of the security dilemma: what seems to one to be a 
necessary defensive precaution might to another seem to be a prelude to attack.37 
 
2.3.2 Political Realism applied to internal Somali conflict 
 
When the Somali state collapsed in the late 1980’s and the beginning of the 1990's, a state of 
anarchy began. This anarchy was not far from Hobbes's bleak description of the original state 
of nature. This anarchy was the result of the collapse of the Barre regime, i.e. the sudden 
absence of a central authority.  As a result of this collapse, the state could no longer provide 
security for its citizens. Thus the responsibility for security was taken up by a host of various 
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groups of various sizes and dispositions, most importantly clans and sub-clans. This was of 
course a rather natural development, as security is, more or less, the primary function of the 
clan38. 
 
As clans and other groups are the primary providers of security within Somali society, and as 
a state of anarchy more or less exists between them, it seems a logical choice to apply the 
theories of Political Realism to explain their actions. According to Barry R Posen state 
collapse leaves behind a number of groups of different levels of cohesion. Posen argues, that 
these groups are forced to pay attention to security, and tend to act in ways outlined by the 
security dilemma.39 One can then assume, that mechanisms outlined by the prisoners’ 
dilemma also apply, especially in issues such as the formation and armament of clan militias, 
offensive warfare, seizing land, infrastructure, or wealth via offensive warfare, participating in 
international peace accords, accepting military assistance from a foreign backer (say, Ethiopia 
or Eritrea) and so forth. 
 
According to Posen, these groups, suddenly responsible for their own security, must first 
assess their strategic position in relation to other groups, and then act accordingly. They must 
ask themselves several questions about their present security situation: which neighboring 
groups constitute a potential threat and if they do, how will the passage of time affect the 
balance of power? Is it better to act sooner, or to wait for a better opportunity? As mentioned 
above, distinguishing between offensive and defensive military capability can be tricky. Thus, 
groups will revert to history as a tool to assess the degree of the threat posed by other groups. 
However, using historical archetypes as reference will result in a worst-case analysis. This is 
so because any historical analysis will most likely be at least partially based on orally 
recorded history, be emotionally charged, and be intentionally warped for political reasons by 
the leaders of different groups. Somalia's present situation certainly presents modern Somali 
leaders with more than enough raw material.40 
 
Though Posen’s technique of applying theories developed for explaining the actions of states 
to non-state actors is not without problems, it seems valid enough to be adopted here as a 
theoretical backdrop.  Somalia’s recent history certainly offers more than enough examples of 
how the mechanisms of the security dilemma worked to aggravate the conflict.  
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2.3.3 Political Realism applied to the Global War on Terror 
 
Realism, a theory well suited to explaining the actions and goals of superpowers is a more 
than adequate tool when analyzing the United States and its Global War on Terror. National 
interest and national security are for the United States, as they are for every country, top 
priorities. It is with this in mind that we must examine the actions of the United States in 
Somalia. That is to say that it must be assumed that the war on terror is not solely about 
fighting terrorism, but an equally important goal is power. Here it is purposeful to adopt the 
view that the US anti-terror involvement in Africa, is also about national interest, for example 
the availability of oil to the US, just as the US anti-terror involvement in the Middle-East can 
be seen to be partially about oil.41  
 
Naturally Morgenthau’s six principles are applicable to studying the United States’ war on 
terror. Accordingly the Global War on Terror must be seen to be about “interest defined as 
power”. Albeit the nature of this power and its projections may vary greatly from time to 
time. Following Morgenthau, it must be assumed that the GWOT is led and fought without 
letting moral considerations or the demands of other spheres of action limit the United States’ 
freedom of action. 
 
2.3.4 Somali Identity 
 
While evaluating how well Political Realism can be applied to the Global War on Terrorism, 
it is important to assess how Somali identity is built. This is because identity is a critical 
factor when evaluating the actions of different non-state actors, their motives, possible future 
courses of action and the plausibility of any solution to the conflict. Understanding the inner 
workings of Somali identification is also crucial in any operative activity on the ground.  
 
A lot has been written on identities, identification theories, nationalisms, and group identities. 
Benedict Anderson’s often quoted work Imagined Communities. Reflections on the Origin 
and Spread of Nationalism is indeed one work worth mentioning. However, Anderson’s 
theories about the imagined and deliberate nature of national group identities seems rather 
irrelevant to the problem at hand. Thomas Eriksen in his article Ethnic identity, national 
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identity and intergroup conflict: The significance of personal experiences42 makes several 
important observations about the nature of ethnic conflicts and identity. First, Eriksen makes 
the case against tagging conflicts to be “ethnic” in nature: In other words, the concept "ethnic 
conflict" is misleading, whether it is used to classify phenomena or to explain hostilities... All 
the conflicts considered here are conflicts over resources perceived as scarce – territory, 
political power, economic gain, employment, recognition; rights in a wide sense. What they 
have in common is their successful appeal to collective identities perceived locally as 
imperative and primordial, identities associated with a deep moral commitment, whether 
ethnic (based on notions of kinship and descent), regional (based on place) or religious 
(based on beliefs and forms of worship). For these reasons, the term "identity politics” is 
preferable as a generic term for all such political movements, whether nonviolent or 
violent.”43 
 
Second, Eriksen reminds his readers of the labile nature of identity: “…identification is 
relational, situational and flexible, and that each person carries a number of potential 
identities, only a few of which become socially significant, making a difference in everyday 
life. Even fewer gain political importance, forming the basis of power struggles and group 
competition. This is not, however, to say that collective identities can be created out of thin 
air. They have to be connected, in credible ways, to people’s personal experiences. These 
experiences in turn are flexible – not only historians, but everybody else as well selects and 
interprets events to make a particular kind of sense of the past – but not indefinitely so.”44 
Eriksen’s arguments seem to fit perfectly to the Somali conflict, taking into account the 
changing nature of Somali identities, especially clan identities (see below).   
 
For the reasons stated above it is worth taking a look at what Somalis identify with and why. 
Several publications have in the past promoted (intentionally or not intentionally) that the 
single major building block of Somali identity is the clan. While the clan is indeed extremely 
important it is hardly the sole basis of identity for Somalis. A sense of being distinctly Somali, 
being “adopted” into another clan, or being a member of a certain village or militia can be just 
as important. In fact, these separate layers of identity can exist simultaneously, overlap, and 
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vary in importance in accordance with the situation at hand, in accordance with Eriksen’s 
views.45     
 
Since it is my aim here to apply state-centric realist theories to states as well as non-state 
actors, it is useful to seek a definition for the state. Barry Buzan offers a useful definition of 
the state as a unit in the international system. According to Buzan there can be no analogy 
between states and individuals in terms of actions because people and states are on different 
levels of coherence. Buzan claims that states are made up of three distinctive components. 
First, the state must have a physical base made up of its land-area and its population. Second, 
the state must have an institutional expression, i.e. an executive government. Third, most 
importantly the idea of said state must be shared by a significant portion of the populace. In 
addition to owning these components, to qualify as a proper state, a unit in the international 
system must be of an adequate size, and must claim complete sovereignty. In understanding 
Buzan’s model, it is useful to see the term “nation” as referring to the idea of the state 
mentioned above (as Buzan partially proposes).46  
 
It can be argued that Buzan’s state mode would be easily applicable to non-state actors in the 
Somali paradigm. This is because surely effective security providing groups, such as clans, 
share the same general requirements as states. A clan or tribe must have an adequate 
population base just as a state, albeit it need not be a large as that of a state. Unlike states 
though, nomadic Somali clans need not necessarily have a strict land area, but rather rights to 
grazing land and so forth. Even though a clan would not have an executive government, it 
would surely need to have some institutional expression, be it a council of elders, a religious 
leader, or some other governing structure.   As of states, the most important attribute of clans 
is that the idea of the clan is shared by its members. Even though clans, sub-clans and diya 
paying groups (see below) do not claim sovereignty in its western sense, they do retain a 
degree of independence and the right to make and break alliances and agreements. 
 
Buzan puts forth four models of links between nation and state. The first model is the nation-
state in which the nation as a nationalistic idea precedes the state. A common example of the 
above circumstances is the formation of Hungary and Germany. The second model is the 
state-nation in which the state was paramount in creation of the nation. Former colonies, 
namely the United States, are classic examples. The third model is the part nation-state. In it 
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the population of the nation forms a majority in several states. North- and South-Korea as 
well as North- and South-Vietnam are examples. In the fourth model, the multinational state, 
the state encompasses several nations. Yugoslavia, Britain, and Austria-Hungary can be said 
to fall into this category. These four models are of course ideal models, and no state in the real 
world fits into any category as such.47  
 
Richard Caplan defines nation-building along similar ideas about nation and state, albeit with 
different terminology: “Nation-building, then, has three distinct but related meanings: the 
creation of a common consciousness or common identity among a people; the establishment 
or the strengthening of governmental and administrative structures within a state or territory; 
and the post-war rehabilitation of states and territories.” 48 
 
Caplan’s nation building definitions seem to refer, in Buzan’s terms, first to establishing the 
idea of the state, second to state-building, i.e. establishing governance and defining physical 
base and third to rehabilitation of both. It seems that nations can survive and exist without 
states but states fail to do so without nations. It is of course clear that the state can not long 
survive without the nation. For example, the idea of a Kurdish state has been harbored by the 
Kurdish people for a lengthy period of time, but a “Kurdistan” has not materialized. Yet few 
would go so far as to claim that a Kurdish national identity (or however one would wish to 
define the idea of the state) does not exist. On the other hand any state without a national 
identity seems likely to be plunged into the purgatory that is civil war. The exception is 
naturally a strong dictatorship (possibly in the form of foreign occupation), which may be 
able to survive for long periods of time without majority approval. With this in mind, it is not 
surprising that Somalia fell into a state of chaos when Barre’s regime collapsed. 49  
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3. Somalia – a failed state and the threat of terrorism 
 
3.1 Somalia, Somali society, Identity and the Clan System 
 
Richard Shultz and Andrea Dew in their study Insurgents, Terrorists, and Militias. The 
Warriors of Contemporary Combat conclude that any intelligence officer wishing to 
understand Somali society must learn to appreciate four distinct factors that have more or less 
molded Somali society into what it is today. These four factors are geography, clan lineage, 
social contract, and Islam.50 Below we shall briefly discuss each of these four factors. It is of 
course evident, that each of these would in itself be broad enough to comprise several 
independent studies.  
 
3.1.1 Geography, Climate, and Population 
 
Although large amounts of oil have not been found in Somalia as of yet, Somalia has in a way 
fallen victim to the “resource curse” none the less. This is because Somalia is situated in a 
strategically important area, in the vicinity of the straight which connects the Red Sea and the 
Gulf of Aden. This straight is part of a maritime-strategically significant area which 
encompasses the Red Sea, the Gulf of Aden, the Suez channel, and the Gulf of Aquaba. This 
area includes several countries, mainly Djibouti, Egypt, Jordan, Saudi Arabia, Somalia, Sudan 
and Yemen. Many of the countries in the area have significant oil and/or gas reserves. Thus, it 
is easy to deduce why the area is viewed as strategically important: It forms an important 
transportation route; nearly 11% of the world’s seaborne oil is transported through it.51 In 
addition to this, Somalia’s maritime position has long been of interest to great powers, not 
least because the fastest sea route between Europe and Asia runs right along its shores. 
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Map of Somalia (political/geographical)52 
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Somalia itself is an arid and unforgiving land, characterized by the small amount of arable 
land.  Somalia has a land area of 637,540 square kilometers, roughly twice the size of Finland. 
Most of this land area is made up of plateaus, plains, and highlands, most of which are 
unsuitable for agriculture. The small amount of land which is suitable for agriculture is 
situated in the southwest of the country, where Somalia's two major rivers, the Jubba and the 
Shabeelle, run northeast to southwest.53 
 
The climate in Somalia is harsh and rigid. For the nomadic Somalis the year is made up of 
four seasons. Two of them, the gu (April through June) and the day (October and November), 
are rainy, and two, hagaa (July through September) and iilaal (December-March) are dry. Gu 
is the most prosperous time of the year for nomads, since it is then that the desert blossoms, 
creating new pasture. Thus Gu is a time of festivities and political activity.54 
 
For the nomadic population the timing and amount of rainfall are extremely important. If 
rainfall is lacking, it is possible even in peacetimes that famine may occur, not to mention in 
times of major conflict. Not surprisingly, resources are scarce. Thus it is easy to see how 
Somali's unforgiving and unpredictable climate and geography fostered and aggravated 
conflict between the nomadic clans. Indeed, it has been argued that Somalia’s harsh 
conditions, characterized by a near desert climate, droughts, and few resources, are the major 
causes of clan conflict. Partly because of this, violence has been institutionalized in Somali 
society. It may be even argued that the lack of resources is the main reason behind the 
Somalia- Ethiopia conflict as well as other protracted conflicts in the greater Horn region55. 
 
Somalia has an estimated population of a little over nine million. A small portion, 
approximately 15%, are estimated to be other than ethnic Somalis, including 30 000 Arabs. 
These figures are of course raw estimates as the ongoing war makes exact censuses 
impossible, and has driven large amounts of people from their homes. Large numbers of 
ethnic Somali live outside Somalia’s borders, especially in the neighboring countries. All in 
all the Somali diaspora is estimated to constitute somewhere between one to three million 
Somalis. Some members of the diaspora have been suspected of funding terrorist 
organizations, possibly in Somalia. Diagram 2 shows the estimated percentage of ethnic 
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Somalis living in the neighboring countries. Kenya’s Somali minority is small, but it is 
geographically concentrated near the Somali border.56 
 
Diagram 2: Relative size of Somali Populations in 
Neighboring Countries 
0 %
10 %
20 %
30 %
40 %
50 %
60 %
70 %
Djibouti   Ethiopia   Kenya   
Relative size of Somali
minority
 
 
3.1.2 The Somali Clan System  
 
Whilst investigating Somalia’s potential as a terrorist safe haven or base of operations, it is 
hardly possible to overestimate the significance of clan affiliation or tribalism. Throughout 
Somali history, the clan system has paid a significant role, and can be seen as one of the 
sources of Somalia’s present strife. 57  
 
Somalia is, generally speaking, ethnically extremely homogenous. Normally one could 
assume that this would have a stabilizing effect on any country. Indeed, one has but to take a 
look at the history of the Balkans to witness the negative effects ethnic diversity can have 
when coupled with regime change. In Somalia, the positive effects of ethnic unity are 
countered by deep divisions along clan or sub-clan lines. These clan divisions, inherent is 
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Somali culture run so deep, that: “...the very fact of sharing a common cultural framework [is 
that] which made Somalis conscious of what made them distinct from other Somalis”. 58 
 
There exists no academic consensus on the structure of the Somali clan system. Generally 
speaking the system is based on a number of clan families. These clan families are each 
divided into several smaller clans, and they again are divided into sub-clans. Clan families are 
not united and bitter divisions exist within them. This is also true for clans and sub-clans. 
Nevertheless, the clan can be seen as the most important term of identity of for Somalis. So 
important, that it is perhaps the only tangible political entity the average Somali knows in 
Somalia.59 
 
The clan system dates back several centuries and originally arose from the need to protect the 
land, livestock, property and so forth of each individual, extended family and tribe. In Somali 
culture property rights do not arise from legal ownership but simply from possession, and 
theft is hardly a moral offence60. This naturally led to the need for a security system, and 
hence the extended families loosely bonded to form clans. These bonds however are not very 
binding in the traditional sense: Jonathan Stevenson in Losing Mogadishu fittingly remarks on 
clan bond by quoting an old Somali proverb: “Me and my clan against the world; me and my 
brother against the clan; me against my brother.”61  
 
Security was, and still is, more or less the primary function of the clan. This loose security 
system, which for centuries kept conflict at a skirmish level, was destroyed, or rather, 
perverted by the Siad Barre regime and the aftermath of its downfall. After rising to power 
General Barre exclusively favored his own clan (or sub-clan), the Marehan and some other 
groups within his Daarood clan-family. Traditionally clans would cooperate, or help their sub-
clan brethren in times of dire need. Once the crisis was over the hierarchically superior group 
would withdraw and tension would recede. Several clans did unite during the late 80’s and 
early 90’s to oust the Barre regime. Tradition would have dictated a return to equilibrium, but 
that was not to be. Remembering Siad Barre’s Marehan favoring policies and the power the 
Marehan had held during the Barre years, each clan scrabbled for the position the Marehan 
had enjoyed. In essence when nomadic tribal traditions were coupled with a corrupt and 
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nepotistic central government, urbanization, modern weapons, and fabricated differences the 
result was a deadly quagmire.62 
 
Researchers disagree on which clan factions in Somalia are to be classified as clan-families, 
clans and sub-clans accordingly. According to Lyons and Samatar the main clan families are 
Saar, Irir and Darod. The Saar consisting of the Rahanwein and Digil clans, the Irir of the Dir, 
Isaaq and Hawiye, and the Darod of the Dolbahante, Mijerteen, Warsangali, Ogden, and 
Marehan63. Ken Menkhaus on the other hand states the clan families to be Daarood, Dir, 
Isaaq, Rahanweyn (of which the Digil clan is a part of), and Hawiye64.  Anna Simons 
proposes yet another classification, claiming to the clan families be Rahanwein, Darod, 
Hawiye, Isaaq, Digil, and Dir65. Yet another classification has bee put forth by Said S. 
Samatar in the Library of Congress’s Country Studies. In this classification the clan families 
are split into two groups, the ones that trace their lineage back to the mythical founding father 
of Somalis, Samaale or Samaal, and the ones that do not. The mostly nomadic clan-families 
that do trace their lineage back to Samaal are collectively called the Samaal clans and include 
the Dir, Daarood, Isaaq, and Hawiye. The ones that do not, include the agricultural Digil and 
Rahanwayn.66 This classification, albeit with slight modifications, is the most common. See 
diagram 3. 
 
Such is the interpretation of Mary-Jane Fox, which shall be adopted here. Her understanding 
of the major clan-families is similar that of Lyons and Samatar and Country Studies (Said S. 
Samatar), with slight spelling deviations:  The two major Sab (or Saab) clan-families are the 
sedentary-pastoral Digil and Rahanwiin located in the south of Somalia and the four major 
Samaale clan-families are the pastoral Dir, Isaaq, Hawie, and Daarood located in the rest of 
the country. The two Sab clan-families are agriculturalist and for them land is important for 
identity, and they are inclined to be more hierarchical that the Samaale. For the Samaale land 
ownership in itself is not that important67, and they seem to be less concerned about hierarchy, 
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even to the extent of being called “egalitarian68.  69 Not surprisingly, all the versions sighted 
above are basically the same as put forth by Lewis, yet again with variations in spelling70. 
 
It has been suggested that the Somali clan system may be Arabic, in origin. During the 11th 
through 13th centuries certain Arabian Shahyk patriarchs, namely Shaykyh Daarood Jabarti 
and Shaykh Isahaaq migrated to Somalia. Shaykh Daarood Jabarti launched what is today 
Somalia’s larges clan-family, the Daarood by marrying Doombira Dir, the daughter of a local 
patriarch. Shaykh Isahaaq founded another of the major clan-families, the Isaaq. Before the 
arrival of the Arabs, Somali society may have been matrilineal. Thus the clan system in its 
present form was possibly imported or influenced from the Arabian peninsula.71 
 
Diagram 3: Somali Clans According to Chopra – Eknes – Nordbø72 
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3.1.3 Social Contract 
 
The endemic violence proceeding from the harsh environment and clan segmentation was not 
allowed to spiral out of control in traditional Somali society. Several mechanisms were 
devised and implemented to keep the violence in check. The most important of these were the 
Somali equivalent of a social contract (heer) governed by elders, blood-money (diya73), 
vendetta killings (godob), limited armed conflict, and poetry.74 
 
Traditionally Somali society was governed by a type of social contract between and within 
clans and sub-clans known as the heer. Heer was based on a type of common law, qanoon, 
which in turn was based on Islamic law. The implementation of heer was enforced by clan 
elders and religious leaders. Those who did not adhere to the heer-based rulings of clan elders 
became outlaws of sorts.75 
 
Diya-paying is a system of dispute settlement in which a transgression preformed against one 
diya-group by another may be compensated for by payment, traditionally in camels.  Almost 
anything can be compensated for by payment, even murder. The diya-system allows diya-
groups to settle conflicts between them without killing and thus stop the violence. The 
knowledge of the necessity of payment also acts as a deterrent for violence.76  
 
A diya-group is, according to Lewis, “a corporate group of a few small lineages reckoning 
descent from four to eight generations to the common founder, and having a membership of 
from a few hundred to a few thousand men.”77  Diya-groups do not necessarily, especially in 
southern Somalia, always follow lineage. It is possible for village membership to be 
considered as important as lineage ties. Indeed, an entire village may function as a diya-
group.78 This group is the fundamental building-block of Somali political organization, a well 
defined social group as well as a political and legal entity. The diya-group co-operates to a 
great degree on several issues, especially security. Indeed, in Lewis's words: “...with the 
difficulty under present conditions of adequately policing much of the country, the security of 
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the individual pastoralist's person and property depends ultimately on his membership of a 
diya-paying group.”79 
 
Godob, the practice of vendetta killings, is another form of conflict management in traditional 
Somali society. Godob is hardly as useful and as effective as diya, but a conflict management 
tool none the less. The practice of Godob is simple; the killing of a member of one clan is 
avenged by that clan by killing the killer or a member of his clan. Vengeance is not 
necessarily carried out immediately, but the victims’ clan may wait several generations before 
retribution is perpetrated. Godob thus gives feud longevity and an unpredictable character.80 
 
Limited armed conflict refers to a mechanism in which two clans, sub-clans, or families, 
fighting over resources such as land would be left to fight among themselves without other 
groups interfering. It is worth noticing that other groups would maintain their distance on as 
long as their own interests were not at stake.81 As is evident though, this system hardly 
functioned in the situation created by Somalia’s state collapse. 
 
3.1.4 Islam in Somalia 
 
Somalis are predominantly Sunni Muslims.82 Nearly 99% of Somalians are Muslim. So, not 
surprisingly, Islam occupies a very central place in Somali culture, and may be considered a 
cornerstone of Somali society.83 The role of Islam is, however distinctively Somali in nature. 
This is evident from three traits of Somali Islam. First, traditionally in Somali culture, the 
religious sphere and the political sphere have been kept separate from each other. In practice 
though, this has not always been a clear-cut division. Because of their religious role teachers 
of Islam (wadads or sheikhs) are expected to remain neutral in times of rivalry and conflict, 
although in practice this tradition is not always adhered to.84 Secondly, since its arrival Islam 
was and still is more or less assimilated into the clan system85. Heer subordinates Islamic or 
sharia forms of retribution to diya-paying and other traditional collective forms of 
punishment. In essence personal responsibility for one’s actions as taught by traditional Islam 
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has been replaced by the traditional Somali concept of the collective guilt and accountability 
of the diya-paying group.86  
 
Thirdly, Islam in Somalia has been considerably influenced by Sufism, as several Sufi sects 
have appeared in Somalia over the course of its history. Interestingly enough Wahhabism has 
also influenced Somali Islam from time to time.87 Sufism has traditionally blended partially 
with the clan system. Genealogical ancestors and founders of Sufi orders are in many places 
worshipped as saints.88 In modern day Somalia the oldest and most widespread religious 
organizations are Sufi brotherhoods. The most influential of these brotherhoods are the 
Quadiriya, Salihiya, and Ahmadiya sects, also found worldwide.89  
 
Islamic- or Sharia-law has not fit perfectly within the nomadic Somali society. In it Sharia 
tends to be restricted to governing relationships between clans and a few personal status 
questions. Sharia rulings outside this sphere are not always adhered to by the nomadic Somali. 
Attempts to strictly impose sharia-law (sometimes including banning the traditional Somali 
narcotic khat) have met with resistance. In other word, Somali sharia, like Somali Islam in 
general, is by definition distinctively Somali in nature.90  
 
3.2 The History of Somalia 
  
What follows is a look into the history of Somalia. Why then such a lengthy look at history? 
The conclusions that can be drawn from observing Somalia’s historical experience form the 
basis for understanding Somalia’s present state and the condition which prevail today. In its 
history are rooted the trends which determine the caliber of the threat Somalia poses in the 
GWOT. 
 
3.2.1 The Rise and Fall of Colonialism in Somalia 
 
Somalis, known to Medieval Arabs as the Berberi, are members of a group of peoples called 
the Eastern Cushites. It was a splinter of a sub group of the Eastern Cushites, called Samaale 
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that moved to and spread over the entire Horn of Africa by 100.A.D. Somalis quickly came 
under Arab influence, a trend that would continue into modern times.  In spite of the fact that 
through the ages sultans and sheiks claimed to rule what is nowadays Somalia, a centralized 
authority or Somali state as such did not exist on any level prior to colonial times. Somalia as 
first observed by the British was a collection of port towns possibly ruled by Arab sultans, of 
semi autonomous clans and sub-clans, of costal areas partially controlled by Egypt, and of 
Somali clans freely trading in the region whilst possibly paying taxes to a local sultan or 
imam.91 
 
All through the first half of the nineteenth century the British gradually grew more and more 
active in Somalia. Aden across the narrow gulf from Somalia was an important waypoint on 
the navigational route to India. The British coaling station and garrison at Adel, which was 
established in 1839, depended mainly on Somalia for its food supplies. After 1800, due to 
expanding British colonial interests in India, British activity in Somalia constantly grew. The 
British established treaties concerning trade, safe passage, and the restriction of slavery with 
different clans in different areas, and along with other traders engaged in active trade with the 
Somalis, at prosperous ports such as Berbera and Seylac (Zeila). This trade, along with British 
influence in the area continued to grow steadily.  The lucrative Anglo-Somalian trade was 
however largely restricted to the northern parts of Somalia. Southerners were for the most part 
denied the perks that flourishing trade brought with it.92 
 
The establishment of British colonial rule in northern Somalia was gradual. No single turning 
point can be named. However, Egyptian activity in the country brought about British power, 
after a fashion: Egypt had established garrisons in several locations around Somalia from 
1875 onward. After Egypt ceded Sudan to Britain, these garrisons were evacuated in 1884. 
When the Egyptians headed northward, they left behind a power vacuum that was then filled 
by the British Empire. Finally in February of 1885 the Somali coast from Ghubbet Kharab to 
Ras Galwein was established as a British protectorate. The British protectorate of Somaliland 
was then officially established in 1887.93  
 
British rule in northern Somalia was not upheld by a strong military or police presence. The 
ratio of British security personnel to Somali population was approximately that of one to a 
thousand. In addition to small disturbances, there was no serious threat to British rule. To this 
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however there was one notable exception, the twenty-year long resistance put up by 
Muhammad Abdullah Hassan (called  the “Mad Mullah” by the British) and his followers. 
Hassan, a member of the puritanical Salihiyah religious order, and his dervish-movement put 
up a resistance that lasted from 1899 to 1920. The Dervish resistance ravaged Somalia and led 
to the death of nearly one third of the population.94 
 
After the British established colonial rule in northern Somalia, the recently unified Italians 
were quick to follow suite. Italy was initially to gain control of southern Somalia through a 
deal brokered by the British. By the time the British protectorate of Somaliland was 
established, the Sultan of Zanzibar, Sayyid Khalifa-bin-Said, controlled Somali ports from 
Mogadishu to Kismayo. After Zanzibar became a British protectorate in 1889, these ports 
passed to the British East Africa Company. The Italians had agreed with the British, that said 
port would be transferred to Italian control immediately after the British gained them from the 
Sultan of Zanzibar. This transaction then took place in 1892.95  
 
With the exception of the very first years, Italian colonial rule in southern Somalia was by 
nature very different than the British one in the north. Italian rule was far from the subtle 
indirect control the British had resorted to, but rather a harsh oppression upheld by direct 
control. Italian controlled Somalia was a plantation economy, the labor for which was 
provided by an extensive slave system the Italians conveniently failed to banish. The Italians 
also established a hierarchical administrative system headed by the Governor of Italian 
Somaliland and extending all the way down to local native chiefs. The difference between 
Italian and British styles of colonial rule stemmed from the fact that the two colonial powers 
had very different goals in Somalia. The British were content to uphold a protectorate to use 
as a coaling station and to provide supplies for their Aden garrison. The Italians on the other 
hand were intent on outright colonization. In addition, for both powers, control over Somalia 
was also about denying it to the French.96 
 
France also established a protectorate in the Horn region, in modern day Djibouti. In 1862 
France acquired the port of Obock, which lies north of the modern capital.  Two decades later, 
in 1888 French Somaliland was established and in 1892 Djibouti became its capital. The 
motive for France’s desire to establish herself in the Horn region were numerous. Like the 
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British, the French required a coaling station for ships headed east. Additionally the French 
desired to cut Britain’s Cairo to Cape Town zone of influence.97 
 
In addition to Britain, Italy and France, the colonial game in the Horn was, uniquely in 
colonial history, also played by an African participant. This African player was the Emperor 
of Ethiopia, Menelik (Menelik II98). During the nineteenth and twentieth centuries Ethiopia 
was, from time to time, an object of colonialism. Ethiopia also worked actively to build a 
colonial empire of its own. In September 1895 Menelik declared war on Italy, and soundly 
defeated them in the Battle of Adowa on March 1st 1896. Italy petitioned for peace, and on 
October 26th 1896 the Treaty of Addis Abeba was signed. In it Italy formally recognized 
Ethiopian sovereignty and independence. 99  
 
Menelik however did not stop there. By 1897 Menelik had managed to extend Ethiopian 
power into Somali inhabited territories.100 This Menelik accomplished by gaining control of 
the independent Muslim Emirate of Harer and of the Ogaden region.101 Later Siad Barre 
would fight a lengthy war with Ethiopia over the control of this region.102 
 
After the turn of the century, barring Muhammad Abdullah Hassan’s activities, began a time 
of colonial consolidation103. The Italian government attempted to lure colonists from the 
homeland by way of economically lucrative land offers, but to no avail. Somalia remained an 
economic burden.104 The fascist regime did launch several extensive development projects. 
British Somaliland remained a rather insignificant colony. Its main purpose remained the 
same throughout colonial years, to provide supplies for Aden. Thus, in spite of a more liberal 
style of rule and less oppressive administration, the British controlled north fell behind the 
Italian ruled south in terms of economic infrastructure.105 
 
Italy continued to push its sphere of influence farther west toward the Ogaden region 
controlled by Menelik’s Ethiopia. This process continued after the turn of the century, and 
peaked in 1935 when Mussolini’s Italy began its attack to subdue Ethiopia. Eventually Italian 
forces were successful, and Italy annexed Ethiopia in 1936. Italian expansion in East Africa 
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however, did not stop there. After the outbreak of World War two Italian forces also 
conquered British Somaliland.106  
 
Thus by 1940 Mussolini had almost accomplished what later rulers in Somalia would strive 
for, unification of all Somali-inhabited lands under one administrative unit. It appears that this 
was a time of relative well-being for many Somalis. Some even managed to accumulate 
formidable economic resources during the Italian occupation, due partially to the Italians 
introducing a common currency to the area.  This state of matter was to be short lived. The 
British struck back in March 1941, and drove fascist forces out of northern Somalia. Further 
British campaigns led to the eviction of the Italians from Somalia and the restoration of the 
Ethiopian throne.  British Somaliland, southern Somalia and the formerly Ethiopian 
controlled Ogaden region were then placed under British military administration. The 
establishing of British military administration once again placed British, Italian, and 
Ethiopian Somaliland under the control of one single government. The British did not 
however establish a unified administration for Somali-inhabited areas and no Somali state was 
established. In 1948 the Ogaden region was returned to the Ethiopian government. 107 
 
After the eviction of the Italians from Somalia, two major trends can be found in Somali 
history. The first of these trends were the problems that would surface in Somalia several 
times during the nineteenth century: general violence and disorder made deadlier in part by 
weapons left in Somalia by departing armies. The second trend was a vast surge in Somali 
political activity108. 
 
As the Italian army withdrew, it often did so with great speed, and thus often left behind great 
numbers of weapons and ammunition. This made the disorder that followed the Italian 
departure very destructive in some areas. Some sources indicate that clan clashes perpetrated 
by well armed clan militias were beginning to show signs of escalation.109 Although modern 
weaponry may not have been the primus motor behind this escalation, it certainly must have 
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increased the body count. Indeed still today, small arms proliferation is a serious problem in 
Somalia.110  
 
As mentioned above, the period was also a time of widespread Somali political activation. As 
a reaction, at least partly, to the possibility that Somalia would yet again be divided, 
Somalia’s first political party, the Somali Youth Club (SYC), was formed in May 1943. Later 
the SYC renamed itself the Somali Youth League (SYL). The SYL would later play a 
prominent part in Somali politics. 111 
 
The original forming of the SYC is a classic case “my enemy’s enemy is my friend”. The 
British military administration could not cope without the Italian civil servants experienced in 
Somalia, and many were employed. In 1943 the Italians in Somalia were allowed to form 
political organizations. Several were formed, many of which fervently demanded the return 
Italian Somaliland to Italian control. As such ideologies were hostile both to British control 
and Somali independence; the British colonial officials and the Somalia independence 
movements began to view each other as allies. British officials encouraged the Somalis to 
organize politically, and thus the SYC was formed.112 
 
The SYC grew briskly, and is reported to have had 25 000 members one year before it 
changed its name to SYL in 1947. In addition to numerical growth, the SYL also expanded 
geographically, and soon had offices in British Somaliland (former) Italian Somaliland, and 
Ogaden, and Somali inhabited parts of Kenya. The SYC/SYL was by nature a nationalist 
organization. Its main goals were: to unify all Somali-inhabited areas, promote education, 
language, and Somali interests and to oppose Italian rule. Interestingly the SYL leadership 
shunned clan affiliations and refused to reveal their ethnic identities. 113 
 
The SYC/SYL was not the only political party to arise in the post World War Two era. 
Several other factions sprung up, some roughly along clan-lines. In contrast to the SYL’s 
nationalistic overtones a second political organization allegedly cooperated with Italian 
factions and its scrimmage with the SYL was economically backed by the Italians. This 
faction was the Hisbia Digil Mirifle (HDM), originally known as the Patriotic Benefit Union. 
True to its name the HDM represented the efforts of the Digil and Mirifle clans. In the north, 
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i.e. British Somaliland the main political organizations were the Isaaq supported Somali 
National League (SNL) , and the United Somali Party (USP) which in turn was supported by 
the Dir and the Daarood. As the reasons behind this rise in political awareness and 
organization Fox lists war-time reports concerning the freeing of oppressed people and anti-
colonial struggles, the lifting of a ban on open political debate, the embarrassing defeat and 
exposed fallibility of the Somalis’ Italian colonial masters and a traditional rejection of 
institutionalized authority114. 
 
In 1945 the Potsdam Conference, not surprisingly, it was decreed that Italy would not be 
given back the African territories it had acquired during the war. The Allied Council of 
Foreign Ministers of the Four Powers Commission, consisting of the foreign ministers of 
Britain, France, the Soviet Union, and the United States, was to decide upon Somalia’s future. 
The council convened in Paris in April and May of 1946. The British proposed a trusteeship 
that would contain the whole of Somalia. Other members of the council, especially Molotov, 
were opposed to this, accusing Britain of imperial schemes.115 
 
In January 1948 the commission sent its representatives to Mogadishu to determine and 
evaluate the political wishes of the local populace. During the hearing demonstrations turned 
into violent riots. However, the commissions hearing was held according to plan. The 
commission heard three different local propositions. First, the SYL’s proposition that all 
Somalis be united under a 10-year international trusteeship. Second, the HDM’s proposal 
which was very similar to the SYL’s. Third a proposition by Italian and Somali factions that 
Somalia be placed back under Italian rule.116  
 
The Allied Council of Foreign Ministers was unable to reach a decision because of diplomatic 
conflicts For various reasons Britain was the only power championing a plan close to the 
SYL’s proposition. Because Britain was not willing to have a falling out with its allies on 
behalf of Somali unity, its proposition was withdrawn. Ultimately the Allied Council of 
Foreign Ministers, unable to reach consensus, referred the matter to the United Nations (UN) 
General Assembly. In 1950 the UN General Assembly ratified a British trusteeship of British 
Somaliland, and an Italian trusteeship of Italian Somaliland117. And so the SYL’s nationalistic 
aspiration and opposition to Italian rule were shattered in the UN.118 
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As the northern and southern parts of Somalia were now once again split between two 
different administrations, their development during the trusteeship period differed greatly. In 
the south, many Somalis resented being under Italian rule.  In fact it has been suggested that 
resentment of Italian rule may have been the key factor behind the political and national 
awakenings in Somalia Whatever the case, Italo-Somali relations were strained, especially for 
the first three years of the trusteeship from 1950 to 1953. During the trusteeship period, 
Islamic Sufi-groups, or tariqas, did not hasten to get involved in politics, except to oppose any 
educational measures that were seen to pose a risk of Christianization.119 
 
The UN established the Italian Trusteeship Administration (Amministrazione Fiduciaria 
Italiana della Somalia, AFIS) to prepare former Italian Somaliland for independence. 
According to the trusteeship agreement the AFIS was to improve the economic and 
educational infrastructures, among others. The AFIS was not very successful in the former, 
although exports trebled between 1954 and 1960. The AFIS made greater progress in the 
latter goal though, but never the less the lack of a written form of the Somali language was a 
problem.120 
 
On the political front the AFIS managed considerable success. In 1950 the Territorial Council 
(TC), a parliament of sorts with an advisory role, was established. General elections (no 
female suffrage) were held in the Italian trusteeship in 1956. The SYL became the largest 
party. Abdullaahi Iise, a SYL representative, became the first prime minister. Although the 
TC had power over domestic matters, the AFIS retained a right of veto to its decisions. In 
general the period from 1956 to independence was politically stable, although SYL interparty 
squabbling did occur.121 
 
In British Somaliland the British administration was not very successful promoting in 
education or economic development. The latter was partially due to neglect during 
protectorate years. Political turmoil was raised by the return of parts of the Ogaden and Haud 
region to the Ethiopians by the British in 1954. To oppose the move, a new party emerged, the 
National United Front (NUF). Its cause however, was a lost one.122 
                                                 
119
 Samatar S. 1992; Ministry of Information  1944, 8. Quoted in Fox 2000, 135; Marchal, Roland: Islamic 
Political Dynamics in the Somali Civil War Before and  After September 11. Quoted in  de Waal, Alex 
(Ed.): Islamism and Its Enemies in the Horn of Africa. Indiana University Press, Bloomington 2004, 116-
117. 
120
 Samatar S. 1992 
121
 Ibid. 
122
 Ibid. 
40 
 
The British trusteeship officials did not allocate political power in Somali hands nearly as 
early as did their Italian counterparts. In 1957, in wake of political protests, a Legislative 
Council was established. The council originally consisted of six members representing the 
major clan-families. General elections in the south were held in 1960, in which the SNL and 
the USP proved victorious.123 
 
Due to popular demand the leaders of the north and south continued to press for independence 
and unification. British Somaliland received its independence on June 26, 1960, and united 
with the Italian trust territory on its independence day, July 1, 1960. Thus establishing the 
independent Somali Republic.124 
 
3.2.2 Nation State, State of the Nation  
 
The first government of the newly independent Somali Republic was a coalition government 
of the SYL, SNL, and the USP. Prime Minister Abd ar-Rashid Ali Shirmarke’s government 
formed a precedent for years to come, as it was balanced out between northerners and 
southerners as well as the main clans, including his own Daarood. In spite of this, unification 
of north and south changed the political map to a great extent. For example prior to 
unification the Isaaq SNL had been the dominant power in the north and the Dir and Daarood 
USP pushed into opposition. Unification however, bestowed upon the USP a chance to 
increase its political influence by allying with the SYL.125 
 
In addition to reshuffling the political landscape, unification brought with it several problems 
pertaining to the differences in the administrative systems the British and the Italians had left 
behind in the north and the south respectively. These problems included different conditions 
of service and rates of pay. The latter condition was severe. In addition to the above, several 
other problems appeared with the differing legal systems as well as considerable fluctuations 
in tariffs and customs dues, and the lack of a common written tongue, just to mention a 
few.126 
 
The question of the Somali written tongue was also a question of interest to Islamic scholars. 
Several versions had been proposed, the adoption of Arabic being the one supported by 
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religious leaders. In spite of the language question, however it can not be said that any 
Islamist faction would have been present in the parliament, the National Assembly.127 
Political Islam had not yet arrived on Somali soil. 
 
Clan affiliations had played a major role in all political systems in Somalia in the past, and the 
independent republic was no exception. In spite of widespread pan-Somali nationalism, the 
clan remained the most important factor in the political arena. No other socio-political frame 
of reference simply carried as much weight as the clan. Thus, reluctantly, nationalist 
politicians had to make use of clan bonds to champion their causes. In addition to clan-
lineages other fault lines did exist within Somali society. Examples of such are the north-
south division and the pan-Somali question. These different fault lines were often 
contradictory. For example the north-south divide split the Daarood.128 
 
In June 1961 Somalia's first national election was held, which was a referendum on the 
constitution. The constitution was approved with flying colors in the south, in fact the number 
of votes for the constitution was greater than the entire population of the region129 , but it was 
supported by less than half of the northern voters. This was an expression of the doubts and 
resentments northerners had about the union. These in turn were sired by the negative effects 
the union had had on the north: A decline in status from a de facto nation-fledgling to 
province, and the unemployment caused by national level officials moving to Mogadishu 
from Hargeisa.130 
 
In May 1962 SNL dissidents split from the government, and later formed a new party, the 
Somali National Congress (SNC), which was predominantly a northern movement, but also 
comprised a southern Hawiye-backed  SYL element. Although the formation of the SNC 
provided Somalia with three national parties as opposed to parties representing just one clan 
or area, it would seem that this ultimately was a step toward clan based politics. As a result of 
internal splits within the Daarood SYL, which were evident in the presidential elections of 
June 1967, the Dir-Isaaq-Hawiye-coalition which was the SNC lost its point and basically 
became an anti-Daarood party131.  
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All in all the first decade of independence was characterized, more or less, by a spirit of 
parliamentary democracy. In the March 1964 elections for the national assembly, opposition 
parties participated to an extent to verify this. The trend however was moving toward an 
authoritarian style rule, even before the rise of Siad Barre. The 1964 elections, as well as the 
1967 presidential elections and its aftermath were marred by a split within the SYL-Daarood 
as mentioned above. As the 1969 general elections approached tribalism and clan based 
politics were on the rise. Political clan- and faction-based political parties were being jump-
started before the election to rally clan support. As a result over sixty parties, represented by 
over a 1000 candidates, took part in the elections, but only five remained, after the elections 
were over. This was because there was a virtual stampede of parliament members to leave the 
opposition to join the government to claim their share of the spoils of office. At the end of the 
day, as the dust settled, only one member of parliament was in opposition! Somalia had 
become a de facto one-party state.132 
 
As the first decade of independence neared its end, government was more and more 
characterized, by corruption, nepotism, bad governance, and the increasingly authoritarian 
styles of the Prime Minister and the President. All in all the entire democratic period was 
politically as well as socially a tumultuous one containing everything from rigged elections to 
attempted military coup.133 
 
3.2.3 The Siad Barre Regime 
 
The 1969 elections left behind an atmosphere of disappointment. Many factions were 
frustrated by the fact that, despite investments in campaigns, they did not achieve the political 
foothold they were vying for. The government of Muhammad Haji Ibrahim Igal became 
increasingly unpopular, and accusations of corruption were common. The days of the Igal 
government were numbered when on October 15th 1969 President Abd ar-Rashid Ali 
Shirmarke was shot by one of his guards. When the SYL decided on a number of actions that 
would get Igal’s government re-appointed, the military decided to intervene.134  
 
On October 21st the army staged a coup, and placed the Supreme Revolutionary Council 
(SRC) in power. The SRC was comprised of police- and army officers, and was headed by 
Major-General Mohamed Siad Barre, who soon became the head of state. The opening years 
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of the Barre Regime were marked by positive developments in the fields of education, namely 
literacy, and public welfare. Barre attempted, and partially succeeded, in uprooting corruption 
and distancing Somalis from clan loyalties.135  
 
One year into office Barre introduced a policy of “scientific socialism”. Important sectors of 
the economy were brought under government control, and in 1975 land was nationalized. 
From the beginning the system of land leases the Barre Regime set up was a victim of 
corruption. In addition to the economic sphere, also the military and political spheres were 
subject to socialist, namely Soviet, influence. In 1976 the Somali Revolutionary Socialist 
Party (SRSP) was formed, which operated as a political control mechanism.136 
 
The military became increasingly dependent on Soviet equipment and assistance. Soviet 
military assistance to Somalia was not restricted to the years of the Barre regime as the 
government of Abd ar-Rashid Ali Shirmarke had signed a military aid agreement with the 
Soviet Union back in 1963. Other sectors of the security apparatus were also styled along 
soviet lines, as the National Security Service (NSS) was headed by a KGB-trained 
commander.137 
 
The NSS embodied the authoritarian aspect of the Barre Regime with its arbitrary powers of 
arrest and surveillance. Ironically in the light of Barre’s anti-tribalism campaign the NSS and 
other internal security organs were dominated by his Marehan138 clan. With time Barre’s rule 
became increasingly oppressive139.  
 
Siad Barre’s tampering with the clan system did not however end in denouncing tribalism. 
Barre, throughout his rule, played a vicious divida et impera -game on the clans. His system 
of pitting clan against clan was carefully devised to maximize his regime’s power. Neither did 
his favoritism end in the security apparatus. Increasingly throughout his rule Barre lavished 
government posts on the three Daarood clans that formed the cornerstone of his rule: his 
native Marehan, his mother’s Ogaden and his son-in-law’s Dolbahante (MOD).140 
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It is noteworthy to point out, that although General Barre attacked tribalism vehemently, the 
other, nearly as ancient institution, Islam went virtually un-harassed. Indeed, in 1972 Barre 
proclaimed that: “As far as socialism is concerned, it is not a heavenly message like Islam but 
a mere system for regulating the relations between man and his utilization of the means of 
production in this world.”. Although religion was not a prime target, Barre was no promoter 
of Islam either. In 1972 it was decided that the Latin alphabet would be utilized to form 
written Somalia, not Arabic. In 1975 a secular Family Code was adopted, which in turn was 
strongly opposed by religious circles. The Barre regime however, did not look kindly upon 
criticism from religious scholars, and a campaign was initiated aimed against “religiously 
backward-oriented people”.141 
 
The rise and spread of political Islam, or Islamism coincided with the Barre regime. In 
February 1974 Somalia joined the Arab League, which increased the number of Somalis 
being trained in religious schools in the Middle-East. This in turn aided the spread of Islamic 
ideas. This trend was strengthened by the Iranian Islamic revolution of 1979, as well as close 
trade relations with the UAE and Wahhabist Saudi Arabia. Several Islamist organizations 
were founded in Somalia just before or during the Barre regime. Very little is known about 
these groups, and very little verified information exists on their activities or importance, 
although they do not seem to have had much of an impact, not at least before the beginning of 
the Somali Civil war. 142  
 
Islamist organizations of the period included at least Wahdat Shabab al Islami143 (Islamic 
Youth Unity) and Jama’at Ahlal Islah144 (Society of Islamic people). Wahdat Shabab al Islami 
was founded in 1969 in Hargeysa. It suffered from prosecution by the Barre regime and 
supported the Somali National Movement (SNM) in the early nineties.  Jama’at Ahlal Islah 
was founded by an Egyptian trained Islamic cleric who was openly critical of the Barre 
regime, and the organization was thus disbanded. Jama’at Ahlal Islah, however later re-
emerged as Jama’at Islah145 (reform group).146 As stated there is very little information on 
these groups, and very little in known about them. In general, whatever their impact may have 
been, Islamism did to appear as an alternative to the Barre regime. Islamism simply could not 
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mobilize enough widespread support. The reasons for this are linked, among other things, to 
the clan-system147.  
 
Barre’s struggle for Somali nationalism peaked with his 1977 attempt to militarily wrestle 
control of the Somali-inhabited region of Ogaden from Ethiopia. The situation that came to be 
as Barre’s troops entered Ethiopia in July 1977 was rather peculiar: Ethiopia and Somalia 
were both client states, of sorts, of the Soviet Union, as the Soviet backed Colonel Mengistu 
who had taken power in February 1977. Initially Somalia was not officially invading the 
Ogaden, but only supporting the Western Somali Liberation Front (WSLF), an Ogadeni 
armed movement. Somalia officially entered the war in February 1978. Despite of initial 
success, Somali forces were forced to withdraw by the Ethiopians who received considerable 
military assistance from Cuba and the USSR. The latter had stepped up to take patronage of 
Ethiopia as the USA withdrew, and in the process abandoned Barre.148  
 
The Ogaden war had serious repercussions for the Barre regime. Generally speaking, for the 
Barre regime, three problems arose out of the  war: A large refugee problem from the Ogaden, 
the loss of a generous superpower patron, and  widespread criticism at home. As Ethiopia re-
conquered the Ogaden, hundreds of thousands of refugees fled to Somalia, causing a nearly 
20% increase in population, a host of problems, and an influx of western aid.149 
 
Politically more serious than the refugee problem was Barre’s break with the USSR. As the 
Soviets sided with Colonel Mengistu, Barre was left without his most powerful ally. In the 
middle of the Ogaden war this was a serious blow to Barre, since the USSR had been his main 
supplier of weapons and other military hardware. Thus Barre was left with only the support of 
a few states. The break with the Soviets, announced publicly on November 13th 1977, was 
received well by the Somali public. This was because the Russians had never been very 
popular in Somalia, as Somalians widely associated the Russians “…with the more oppressive 
aspects of Siyads regime.” Denouncing the Soviets thus actually boosted the popularity of 
Barre’s government. Owing to Cold War mechanism however, the loss of Russian aid was a 
short lived predicament: The US soon stepped in to take the place of Somalia’s superpower 
patron. Symbolic of this, in March 1982 Barre paid his first official visit to the US.150 
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As it was a severe blow to Somali nationalism, the Ogaden defeat was widely criticized, and 
that criticism was voiced more and more openly. Discontent was widespread. In April 1978 a 
military coup was staged in southern Somalia my a number of colonels from the Majerteyn 
clan. The coup was unsuccessful, but unrest continued . The Majerteyn-elements in the 
Mudugh area associated with the unsuccessful coup formed an armed resistance group, the 
Somali Salvation Democratic Front (SSDF) by the end of 1981. The SSDF began its military 
operations with Ethiopian support. Simultaneously with the rise of the SSDF there appeared 
another resistance group, the Somali National Movement (SNM). The SNM was mainly a 
front for the elements of the Isaaq clan based in Togdher region. Like the SSDF the SNM 
perpetrated a series of military operations against forces loyal to Barre. Barre. retaliated with 
dictatorial brutality; on the other hand.151 
 
After  the Ogaden war Barre’s rule became even more authoritarian and oppressive. He began 
more and more to favor his own clan, the Marehan. The old MOD tripartite alliance was 
discarded. Barre was, what Lewis calls a “practical Machiavelli”, and he acted accordingly. 
He armed other clans to fight those in opposition to his rule, thus preventing them from 
forming a coherent alliance. His tactics of political survival could only be described as divida 
et impera. Barre utilized the same methods within his government. He was hell bent on 
remaining in power.152  
 
Internal struggles increased after Barre’s May 1986 car accident, which he barely survived. 
Barre was hospitalized in Saudi Arabia until June. Barre’s absence and apparent incomplete 
recovery caused certain Marehan elements to become increasingly concerned with their own 
political survival. Different elements within the Marehan began competing for power and 
making preparations in case of Barre’s withdrawal.153  
 
3.2.4 Civil War and Intervention  
Toward the end of the 1980’s, insurgency in Somalia advanced to the level of civil war. 
Managing the insurgency became the main concern of the Barre regime. Armed insurgencies 
were dealt with ruthlessly by the armed forces and security services. Such hard line tactics 
were not successful in putting down the insurgency, but rather encouraged armed resistance, 
and indirectly gave rise to several resistance groups.154  
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In addition to the SSDF and the SNM, numerous other, mainly clan based, factions arose to 
resist the Barre regime and compete for power: the United Somali Congress (USC), the 
Somali Patriotic Movement (SPM), the Somali Democratic Alliance (SDA), the Somali 
National Front (SNF), and several others. The USC drew its support mainly from the Hawiye 
clans of central Somalia. The SPM, launched in 1989, on the other hand was distinctively 
Ogadeni and the SDA hailed from the Gadabursi (a clan of the Dir clan-family155). The SNF 
seems to have been an alliance formed between different Daarood elements, including Barre 
supporters.156 
 
These different groups wielded various amounts of power in Somalia.  In fact, since alliances 
were shifting in nature, the relative power of these groups was in a state of constant change.  
Alliances were made and broken in rapid succession. Alliances and deals were also formed 
over clan lines, as one sub-clan would seek support or protection against another sub-clan. 
Table 1 sums the clan affiliations of some the different factions.157  
 
Table 1: Clan Affiliations of the Different Factions and Armed Groups 
 
Abbreviation Name Affiliation 
SSDF Somali Salvation Democratic Front Majerteyn 
SNM Somali National Movement Isaaq 
USC United Somali Congress Hawiye 
SPM Somali Patriotic Movement Ogadeen 
SDA Somali Democratic Alliance  Gadabursi (Dir) 
SNF Somali National Front Daarood 
 
 
These factions competed and fought with each other as well as Barre supporters. As their only 
political or ideological goal seems to have been power, they were rarely able to cooperate. 
One significant exception to this rule was made however in August 1990 when the SNM, 
SPM, and the USC agreed to act in unison to oust Barre. A series of events, however led to 
Barre’s downfall sooner than many had expected.158  
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As fighting broke out between two Hawiye subclans within the USC fold, the Abgal and the 
Habr Gedir. Barre tried to utilize the chaos brought forth by the infighting to destroy the USC, 
but ended up setting off a popular uprising against his government. Anti-Barre militias 
flooded Mogadishu as the USC and the SPM brought in more troops. With the newfound 
strength of increased numbers, they were able to force Barre and his followers out of 
Mogadishu. Barre’s 22-year reign had come to an end.159 
  
After President Siad Barre’s fall from power in January 1991, Somalia was plunged deeper 
into chaos and civil war. Several, mostly clan-based, political factions fought for power. An 
abundance of small arms left behind by years of superpower patronage helped fan the flames. 
As Somalia had suffered from drought a few years earlier, famine was rampant. This famine 
was deeply aggravated by the civil war, and 300 000 lives were lost. In addition 1,5 million 
people were in great danger of perishing. One million people were displaced. 160 
 
The fiercest fighting took place in Mogadishu, between the two Hawiye factios: the Habr 
Gedir of General Mohamed Farah Aidid and the Abgal Ali Mahdi Mohamed, both USC 
factions which had fought each other before. This protracted violence was a result of the 
inability of the two Hawiye factions to share power: Whilst Aidid was still occupied chasing 
Barre outside Mogadishu, Ali Mahdi set up an government and had himself proclaimed 
Interim President 161 
 
After an impressive round of diplomacy by United Nations Secretary-General Boutros 
Boutros-Ghali, Under-Secretary-General for Political Affairs James Jonah and others, both 
factions in Mogadishu agreed to accept the deployment of a United Nations security 
component for convoys of humanitarian assistance, as well as 20 unarmed military observers 
on each side of Mogadishu to monitor the ceasefire. As a prelude to what was to come, the 
observers were fired upon soon after they arrived. Thus UNOSOM started off as a simple 
observer mission, grew to become the largest peace-support mission in UN history, only to be 
brought down as quickly as it was begun. 162 
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On April 24th 1992 resolution 751 was adopted by the UN Security Council (UNSC). In it the 
UNSC established United Nations Operation in Somalia (UNOSOM). The “commanders 
intent” for UNOSOM was that a small contingent of unarmed United Nations military 
observers would monitor the cease fire in Mogadishu, and the intended security element 
would provide security for UN personnel and supplies as well as escort deliveries of 
humanitarian supplies to the rest of the country. I.e. the international community resorted to 
military means as civilian ones simply could not safely stand alone. On September 14th 1992, 
the first group of security personnel arrived in Mogadishu.163 
 
Humanitarian supplies however, were not reaching those in need. Supply convoys were often 
looted, sometimes by the same Somali gunmen that were paid to protect them.164 As a 
response to continuing famine the UNSC authorized the use of force to ensure the flow of 
humanitarian relief. This move preceded the deployment of a large military force consisting 
mainly of US forces165. The operation was known to the UN as Unified Task Force 
(UNITAF), but US officials dubbed it Operation Restore Hope. UNITAF forces were 
deployed from December 9th 1992 onward.166 By the beginning of 1993 supplies were once 
again being delivered. Later on UNITAF was “painted blue” and responsibility was 
transferred over to a new UN mission, UNOSOM II.167 
 
As Somalia remained extremely unstable and violent, UNOSOM II was beginning to have 
problems. Aidid and the UN had been suspicious of each other from the beginning, and soon 
after being established, UNOSOM II, partially due to influence of US officials, de facto 
declared war on Aidid. Soon the inevitable happened: In June 1993 UNOSOM II-forces 
clashed with Aidid’s militia. The UN body count was 24 Pakistani soldiers killed. Several 
battles ensured. UNOSOM attacks on Aidid’s forces were spearheaded by the US Rapid 
Deployment Force (USRDF). UNOSOM was no longer an outside arbiter of, but a party to, 
civil war. After the Battle of Mogadishu (in which 18 US servicemen were killed) 
Washington changed its policy. The US decided to withdraw its forces by March 1994. Most 
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European countries followed suit. A severely weakened UNOSOM was withdrawn in March 
1995, a month ahead of schedule. 
                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                           
3.2.5 The Rise of Islamism? 
 
After UNOSOM’s retreat, chaos prevailed is Somalia proper. Different USC factions in 
Mogadishu continued to fight each other, as well as other factions. The northern part of the 
country however experienced what was the rise of a semblance of government. In the Isaaq 
dominated northwest the republic of Somaliland was formed, while the mostly Majerteen 
northeast saw the rise of Puntland.168 
 
Somaliland had declared independence from Somalia on May 18th 1991. Though not 
recognized by the UN as an independent state, Somaliland began to build up all the trappings 
of statehood and managed to restore a semblance of normalcy to everyday life. After a short 
period of renewed infighting, order was reestablished in 1997. Somaliland remains 
unrecognized internationally, but has been moderately successful in building a functioning 
state structure. 169 
 
The north-eastern region of Somalia, roughly one-third of Somalia’s geographical area, 
followed a “similar yet different” path as Somaliland had.. The north-eastern region, 
dominated by the Majerteyn sub-clan of the Daarood, was cleansed from Barre supporters by 
the Majerteyn SSDF in the early years of the 1990’s. The SSDF was successful in 
consolidating its power in the region, and driving out the AIAI, which had become 
troublesome.  After initial problems, in 1998 the SSDF and its allies formed the Puntland state 
of Somalia. Puntland did not however, follow Somaliland in declaring independence, but has 
remained an autonomous region of Somalia.170 
 
Since the fall of Barre’s government, over a dozen peace initiatives or peace conferences have 
been held, most complete failures171. In 2000 the Djibouti government sponsored the so-called 
Arta process, named after the Djiboutian town of Arta where the conference was held. 
Though rife with problems, the process managed the formation of the Transitional National 
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Government (TNG). Although recognized by the UN, the TNG soon disintegrated into just 
another faction. Its mandate expired in August 2003. Yet another peace initiative had failed. 
Interestingly enough, several Islamist factions, including court representatives jockeyed for 
power and a position in government in a manner resembling that of secular factions. Behaving 
like just another Somali faction cost the Islamists considerable credibility.172 
 
The TNG was followed by yet another attempt to form a central government. This time talks 
were held from 2002 to 2004 by the Intergovenmental Authority on Development (IGAD). 
The peace talks resulted in the proclamation of the Transitional Federal Government (TFG). 
The TFG was made up of a 275 member parliament and a cabinet consisting of over 80 
members. Abdullahi Yusuf became Somalia’s “President” and Ali Mohamed Ghedi became 
the TFG’s Prime Minister. The TFG, effectively a loose power sharing coalition dominated 
by the Daarood, was vehemently anti-Islamist and pro-Ethiopian. Its plans to bring foreign 
(including Ethiopian) peacekeepers to Mogadishu made it increasingly unpopular among the 
Hawiye and the Islamists. This despite the fact that Ali Mohamed Ghedi was Hawiye in 
origin. 173 
 
Tensions between the TFG, different warlord and their factions and the different Islamic 
factions began to rise. By the end of 2006 a large group of Somali warlords had formed the 
Alliance for Restoration of Peace and Counterterrorism (ARPCT). The ARPCT seemingly 
received large amounts of US financial baking. This however was not enough to keep the 
warlords in power: By June/July 2006 the   Islamic Courts Union (ICU, see chapter 3.3.3) had 
expelled ARPCT forces from Mogadishu. The ICU soon went on to capture large amounts of 
the southern half of Somalia. ICU rule was moderately popular, as it provided a modicum of 
law and order an contrast to the anarchy which had characterized Somalia since the collapse 
of Barre’s regime.174 
 
The ICU’s rise to power made Ethiopia nervous. This was due to several reasons. ICU official 
had already displayed pan-Somali tendencies, possibly harbouring intentions to incorporate 
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Ethiopia’s Somali territories into a grater Somalia. Some top ICU figures were closely 
associated with Ethiopia’s old rival, the AIAI. The ICU effectively made the prospects of the 
pro-Ethiopian TFG ever gaining control of Somalia look grim indeed. All in all an ICU 
controlled, possibly Islamist Somalia was, from the Ethiopian perspective, a legitimate 
geopolitical threat.175  
 
To counter this threat, Ethiopia sent military forces into Somalia at the end of 2006. Ethiopian 
military might quickly routed the ICU militia, and the Islamist were forced to retreat. The 
lightly armed ICU militia did not stand a chance against the massive firepower of Ethiopian 
regular forces backed by air strikes and artillery fire. ICU forces however were not destroyed, 
only forced to change their tactics. Numerous different groups have moved from direct 
resistance to fighting an unconventional insurgency against the Ethiopians and TFG forces. 
Civilian casualties, an unavoidable consequence of fighting large battles in densely populated 
Mogadishu, have been numerous.176  
 
All in all chaos and war have once again drowned Somalia in their deadly embrace. Battles 
between rival groups are constant. Pirates pray on maritime traffic along Somalia’s shores. An 
Islamic insurgency continues to fight government forces and Ethiopian troops. Somalia’s 
neighbors continue to play out their rivalries by supporting their proxies in Somalia. Somalia 
suffers yet another humanitarian catastrophe, as large amounts of people have been forced to 
leave their homes because of the fighting. This catastrophe has been aggravated by the fact 
that some international humanitarian NGOs have been force to evacuate their personnel and 
cease all operations. The present situation in Somalia looks bleak indeed.177 
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3.3 Islamic movements in Somalia 
 
The potential terrorist threat in present day Somalia comes exclusively from Islamic 
movements.178 Thus the history and nature of these movements is worth studying. As 
discussed above, the history of political Islam, Islamism, and Islamic movements in Somalia 
is rather brief. The Islamic movement was transported to Somalia from Arabic countries via 
students mainly during the Barre regime. Small factions and Islamic study groups grew active 
during the 80’s. Such groups were typically made up of young educated men, possibly 
educated in the Arab countries. These groups were originally part of or closely linked with the 
Muslim Brotherhood, but soon formed their own movements179.  
 
Islamic movements in present day Somalia can be roughly classified according to functions 
and long term objectives into jihad-movements, political Islamic movements, and Islamist 
services.180 Jihad-movements have resorted to violence to promote the “House of Islam” 
(Islamic lands) and Islamic community against infidels. Political Islamic movements are 
movements which prioritize political movement, not armed struggle. Some rather extravagant 
claims have been made about Somali’s al-Qaida connections, but most seem to be based on 
rather unreliable information. In fact, Al-Qaida’s Somali endeavors ran into several problems 
in the early 1990’s. It is reasonable to assume that some of the same problems persist today.181 
 
3.3.1 Jihad-movements 
 
Jihad-movements, Jihadi Islamism or jihadism are rather small in Somalia, and do not 
constitute a mass movement in themselves. Of the Islamic movements in Somalia, the one 
which is most infamous in terms of the GWOT is naturally al-Itihaad al-Islaami (AIAI). Soon 
after the 9/11 -attacks AIAI appeared on a US list of organizations linked to terrorism. 
However AIAI, in its original form, no longer seems to exists. Its present importance and 
magnitude, even its very existence is subject to debate.182 
 
The history of the AIAI begins with an Islamic movement al-Jama’a al-Islamiyya, which 
aimed at purification of Islam. It was originally just a religious organization without political 
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ambitions as such. Many of its leading figures were later to become to leaders of AIAI. Al-
Jama’a al-Islamiyya gradually became affiliated with a similar organization from northern 
Somalia named Wahdat al-Shabaab al- Islaamiyya. During the first half of the 1980’s the two 
organizations loosely merged to form the AIAI. AIAI grew very popular with students, 
offering an ideology to replace Barre’s scientific socialism. AIAI followers also clashed with 
Sufis from time to time. As the decade drew towards its end AIAI became more and more 
popular, and even openly criticized the Barre regime.183 
 
When the Somali civil war broke out AIAI originally refused take part in the armed struggle 
like other factions, even though it was prodded to do so by a number of Somali mujaheddin 
from Aghanistan. However, as the USC captured Mogadishu, the Daarood members of AIAI, 
along with the other Daarood were pushed out. A militant faction of Daarood AIAI members 
fought Aidid’s USC, but was soundly defeated, and the AIAI was scattered.  The battles with 
the USC, although they ended in defeat, convinced a large number of AIAI of the necessity of 
armed struggle to further their goals.184  
 
During the first decade civil war the AIAI aspired several times to permanently gain control 
of certain areas, but failed. 185 These areas included the port town of Bosaaso, the port town of 
Laas Qorayon on the Red Sea coast, Buulo Haawa, and the town of Luuq. Luuq was AIAI’s 
most important possession, but in 1996 it was driven out by Ethiopian forces.186 While 
controlling Luuq the AIAI had problems establishing an universalist Islamist identity that 
would transcend clan: Most of the AIAI leadership was from the locally dominant Marehan. 
Islamic rule attracted Islamists from other clans to move to Luuq. This resulted in the local 
secular Marehan leadership portraying the AIAI as a foreign influence. Thus the AIAI was 
forced to insist that it was Marehan, while at the same time preaching the predominance of 
religion over clan affiliations. The more it emphasized its Marehan nature, the more it 
alienated members of clans from the jihadist cause. On the other hand, the more it claimed 
that Islam was its members’ only clan, the more it furthered itself from the locally powerful 
Marehan.187  
 
AIAI learned from its mistakes, and altered its tactics. It gave up trying to directly control 
territory, thus denying its enemies a target to direct firepower against. AIAI began to operate 
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in different clan frameworks, offering social and educational services. AIAI aimed to infiltrate 
the business sector as well as local administrative bodies. AIAI also managed to infiltrate 
some of the different sharia-court being established throughout the country.188 Reports 
claimed that the AIAI was de facto disbanded. Whether or not this is the state of matters, it 
remains that some AIAI “alumni” have continued the jihadist struggle, albeit with new terror 
tactics. Tactics which somewhat resemble those employed by al-Qaida affiliated movements 
in the Middle-East.189   
 
Unlike some US officials would have it understood190, AIAI is not just another name for the 
Islamic Courts Union, ICU, which gained control of most of southern Somalia by fall 2006. 
However, connections do exist and they function..191 For example recent reports of foreign 
fighter testify to this.192 Thus it is probable that if the ICU had remained in power, AIAI’s 
remnants operational capabilities would have increased. Despite the Ethiopian intervention, 
this may yet happen. Especially if Somali Islamists fighting the Ethiopian occupation are 
widely perceived as fighting for Somalia against a foreign invader instead of an Islamic 
state.193   
 
3.3.2 Political Islam 
 
Political Islamic movements in Somalia can be seen to be composed of different factions, 
traditionalists and Salafist reformists, “nonviolent” Salafists and other groups.194 Below a few 
of relative importance will be briefly discussed. It must be noted that what is now of these 
groups is rather unreliable. Analysts disagree on the true nature of many of these groups, their 
organizations and  demarcation lines between each other and between themselves and the 
AIAI. 
 
By far the largest group is that of Sufi traditionalists, many of which operate trough the 
remnants of the Sufi brotherhoods. These Brotherhoods have lost much of their influence 
through the course of the civil war. Some of the traditionalists had organized themselves into 
an organization by the name of Majma’ ‘Ulimadda Islaamka Ee Soomaaliya, Majma for short. 
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In 1991 Aidid approached Majma’ and proposed cooperation against jihadists. Those that 
accepted Aidid’s call broke away from Majma’ to form a traditionalist umbrella organization 
called Ahlu Sunna wal Jama’a (ASWJ). 195  
 
Majma’s aim is uphold the Islamic values it hold dear, preferably through a Somali 
government that will adhere to the Shafi’i madhhab tradition of Sharia-law. Majma’ has 
concentrated on providing basic services, like religious education. Majma’ id not engaged in 
politics, but vehemently support establishing the authority of Sharia-law, and thus support the 
Sharia-courts. It seems that Majma’ is what it claims to be; a group of Islamic scholars 
supporting Sharia-law.196 
 
ASWJ is an organization of Somali Sufi leaders that opposes the rise of reformist Islamist 
groups, protecting Somali Islamic practices from foreign, i.e. Wahhabist, influences. It has 
lost most of its power since the early 90’s. Even its founding father of sorts, Aidid, abandoned 
it rather soon after its formation. ASWJ’s grates strength however, remains to be cultural 
nationalism, as it seeks to portray Wahhabism,  Salafist reformists, and the AIAI as non-
Somali.197  
 
Progressive reformists are an important political Islamic group in modern Somalia. Of these 
probably the most prominent is the non-Salafist Harakat al-Islah. Al-Islah’s ideological roots 
lay with the Muslim Brotherhood. Al-Islah aims to reform Islam to meet modern challenges. 
More specifically, it advocates the formation of a Islamic state not in contradiction with 
democratic values.  Its members are mostly educated urban professionals and students, and it 
is centered in Mogadishu. Formed in the late 1970’s it began operating openly only after Siad 
Barre’s downfall. Presently al-Islah’s activities, like those of several other Islamic 
movements, focus on education.198 
 
Al-Islah has bee keen to stress that it is not fundamentalist, not anti-western, not anti-
democratic, and that it most certainly is not the political wing of the AIAI. The credibility of 
these claims have been widely called into question. Al-Islah, however does practice a 
democracy of sort within its own ranks, and it has performed friendly gestures toward the US, 
while not refraining from criticizing the US’s GWOT-actions in Somalia. Its relationship with 
the AIAI is definitely not friendly; the two movements are ideologically incompatible and 
                                                 
195
  Menkhaus 2005, 32-38; ICG 2005, 16 
196
  ICG, 16-17. 
197
  Menkhaus 2005, 33; ICG 2005, 15-16. 
198
  Menkhaus 2005, 33-34; ICG 2005, 13. 
57 
their methods differ greatly. Al-Islah is (at least potentially) a moderating factor within the 
Somali Islamic scene. 199 
 
In addition to the militant AIAI, other Salafist movements exist in Somalia. Groups such as 
Al Tabliq and Majuma Ulema are highly conservative, but have denounced the use of 
violence to forward their salafist goals. However, the actual distance between such groups as 
Al Tabliq and Somali Jihadists is hard to discern.200 
 
3.3.3 Sharia-courts  
 
When the Barre regime collapsed, along with it collapsed the judicial structures of the Somali 
Republic. In the chaos that followed Barre’s demise, the need for some kind of legal and 
security structures was evident. This need was answered by the formation of the Sharia-
courts. The early courts drew their power from the two factors that continued to hold sway in 
Somalia: the clan system and Islam.  Each court was appointed by a clan (or sub-clan) and 
had jurisdiction only over its members. Islamic sharia-law was turned to, partially because of 
the lack of any alternative. The rise of the courts was slow, but by the end of 1996 several 
courts had been established and new ones were being founded. The courts benefited the 
general public by supplying a degree of security and rule-of-law while simultaneously 
providing Somali businessmen with a secure environment for trade. In return the local 
businessmen helped finance the court and its militia. It must be noted however that court 
militias were not and are not solely composed of devout Muslim mujaheddin. While being 
partially better disciplined than traditional clan militias they are mostly composed of normal 
militiamen who will work for any employer that pays them enough.201 
 
As the court system grew, the court began to cooperate coordinate their actions. The Shari’a 
Implementation Council was formed in Mogadishu in 2000, but not much came of the 
initiative and it was soon forgotten. In 2004, the formation of a larger sharia-court 
organization was attempted a second time, and thus the Supreme Council of Islamic Courts of 
Somalia (SCICS) (here also referred to as the Islamic Courts Union, ICU) was formed. Sheikh 
Sharif Sheikh Ahmed was appointed as its chairman. With the formation of the Council, the 
Sharia-court system began to expand and gain popular support. Popularity among the general 
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public was a direct result of the security the courts provided. There is some confusion related 
to the actual links between the SCICS and the ICU. 202 
 
The Courts are not a uniform group with a uniform ideological record. Rather, they are a very 
heterogeneous collection of factions with differing agendas and differing ideologies, 
including AIAI elements.203  Sheikh Sharif Sheikh Ahmed is a moderate ASWJ affiliate, but 
his deputies Sheikh Hassan Dahir Aweys and Adan Hashi Ayro are (former) high ranking 
AIAI.204 The ICU is of course not void of clan connections, and can bee seen to be dominated 
by the Hawiye, especially in the Mogadishu region. However, it would be going too far to call 
it a distinctively Hawiye faction.205 
 
As mentioned, several factions have started an insurgency against Ethiopian forces after the 
invasion, several of them Islamic in background. The most prominent, and infamous, of these 
groups is the former “elite” militia of the ICU. This militia, known as “Shabaab” (Youth), is 
now an Islamist extremist militia fighting Ethiopian and TFG forces. Its ultimate goal is the 
formation of an Islamist Somalia. Despite US claims of al-Qaida connections, Shabaab seems 
to be a distinctively Somali organization, albeit with the un-Somali characteristic of seeking 
to offer an alternative to clan -based militias. This may not be solely propaganda, for while 
many former ICU militiamen have returned into the fold of their clans’ militias, Shabaab 
combatants remain dedicated to their Islamist goals. Known for its ruthless methods, Shabaab 
continues to fight an insurgency against Ethiopian and TFG forces, possibly with Eritrean 
backing. Shabaab’s present strength is estimated at several hundred. Other insurgent factions  
include the “Tawhid wa’l-Jihad Brigades in Somalia” (Unity and Struggle) and “The Young 
Mujahideen Movement in Somalia”. One of the most powerful resistance groups could 
possibly turn out to be the Alliance for the Liberation of Somalia (ALS). The ALS, formed by 
ICU remnants and other opposition elements with Eritrean backing may be able to at lest 
temporarily, unify many different opposition factions against a common enemy, the Ethiopian 
occupation forces.206 
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4. The United States War on Terror in Somalia 
 
Ever since the terror attacks of September 11th, the United States has been perpetrating a 
series of policies, operations, programs and initiatives to protect the United States’ citizens, 
national security, and global interests from terrorist attacks. These actions have raised a lot of 
controversy abroad and at home; indeed, no consensus has been reached in what the 
phenomenon should be called. Some government officials have even forbid their subordinates 
from using certain terms to describe it. 207 It has been dubbed “a global struggle against 
violent extremism”208, “The Long War”209, “the global war on terror”210 and ”ongoing 
military operations throughout the world”211 as well as other similar expressions. Here we 
shall call it the Global War on Terrorism (GWOT), the expression President Bush (jr.) used in 
the immediate aftermath of the September 11th attacks. 
 
Irregardless of name it is without doubt that the GWOT will be a prolonged, large scale, 
multifaceted, and casualty ridden struggle. Without a clear symmetrical opponent to strike at 
with massive firepower, the United States faces an opponent which is probably more elusive 
and more capable of adapting than any foe it has faced in the past. Naturally, to defeat such a 
foe as international terrorists, a versatile strategy, encompassing a multitude of means and 
assets is required.  Thus, the GWOT is to be fought simultaneously on many different fronts, 
political and military as well as economic. 
 
Below I shall briefly discuss the policies behind the GWOT and contrast them with the 
actions the US has taken in the Horn of Africa. As stated above, for research purposes the US 
strategy for the GWOT will be derived from The National Security Strategy of the United 
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States of America (2006, NSS 2006)212, The National Military Strategy of the United States of 
America (2004, NMS 2004)213, the National Military Strategic Plan for the War on 
Terrorism214 (NMSP-WOT), the National Strategy for Combating Terrorism215(NSCT), and 
the Quadrennial Defense Review Report (QRD2006)216. Although said documents do not all 
solely focus on terrorism, it never the less, remains pivotal. These documents are somewhat 
different in nature and purpose. They partially overlap whilst simultaneously discussing 
similar themes from rather different points of view.   
 
These documents have been chosen because they represent different sectors of the US 
government, and represent both civilian and military viewpoints. The NSS2006 is a product 
of the executive branch, while the NMS2004 is issued by the Joint Chiefs of Staff. The NSCT 
was released by President Bush and his administration while the NMSP-WOT was released, 
with DoD consent, by the former Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, U.S. Marine General 
Peter Pace. The QRD2006 is a product of the DoD. The relations of these documents will be 
discussed below. Other potential documents include the The National Defense Strategy 
of The United States of America (NDS2005)217,  Joint Publication 1 – Doctrine for the Armed 
Forces of the United States (JP12007)218, Joint Publication 3-07.2 - Joint Tactics, Techniques, 
and Procedures for Antiterrorism (JP 3-07.2)219, The 9/11 Commission Report, and several 
other documents. Due to the limited nature of this paper, analysis must be restricted to those 
policy documents mentioned above.   
 
Several documents concerning recent or ongoing military operations, as well as intelligence 
reports, and security assessments and similar documents are classified and unavailable. Thus, 
when it comes to operational specifics, I have relied mostly on international news services 
and “educated guesses”. Therefore what follows can not be an accurate operational 
                                                 
212
  The National Security Strategy of the United States of America (2006). Available at 
<http://www.whitehouse.gov/nsc/nss/2006/nss2006.pdf >. 
213
  The National Military Strategy of the United States of America (2004). Available at 
<http://www.au.af.mil/au/awc/awcgate/nms/nms.pdf >. 
214
  National Military Strategic Plan for the War on Terrorism (2006). Unclassified version. Available at 
<http://www.defenselink.mil/qdr/docs/2005-01-25-Strategic-Plan.pdf >. 
215
  National Strategy for Combating Terrorism (2006). Available at 
<http://www.whitehouse.gov/nsc/nsct/2006/nsct2006.pdf>. 
216
  Quadrennial Defense Review Report (2006). Available at 
<http://www.defenselink.mil/qdr/report/Report20060203.pdf >. 
217
  The National Defense Strategy of The United States of America (2005). Available at 
<https://acc.dau.mil/CommunityBrowser.aspx?id=32586>. 
218
  Joint Publication 1 – Doctrine for the Armed Forces of the United States (JP12007). Available at < 
http://www.dtic.mil/doctrine/jel/new_pubs/jp1.pdf>. 
219
  Joint Tactics, Techniques, and Procedures for Antiterrorism (1998). Available at 
<http://www.dtic.mil/doctrine/jel/new_pubs/jp3_07_2.pdf>. 
61 
National Security Strategy 
of the United States of 
description. It must be noted however, that military details are more or less irrelevant for the 
questions at had; what matters most is the nature of the US involvement in Somalia. 
 
4.1 The Global War on Terror: Policy 
 
The NSS2006, the NDS2005, the NMS2004, the NSCT2006, the NMSP-WOT, and the 
QRD2006 hail from different levels of government, and are documents of different policy 
levels. While they may all be coined as the “strategic”, there exists a hierarchy between them. 
The NSS is of course the first and foremost of these documents, from it are derived all others. 
The following diagram depicts this hierarchy: 
 
Diagram 4: Hierarchy of National Strategies of the United States 220 
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As depicted in Diagram 4, the NSS lays down the basic guidelines for the NMS and the QRD, 
the QRD also influences the NMS and through it, Joint Publications. One discrepancy must be 
noted here: The NMS available while writing was the NMS2004, which is not based on the 
NSS2006 and the newest QRD, but rather the previous NSS and QRD. The same goes for the 
NDS2005. While this is not a major problem, it must be kept in mind. 
 
Each of these documents provides, directly or indirectly, “official” insight into the nature and 
causes of, and solutions to, the threat posed by terrorism. While not all of the documents go 
into specifics, they none the less give insight into the policies behind the GWOT. Each 
document will be analyzed below in light of three factors:  
 
1. How each document defines, classifies, or describes terrorists / terrorism and the GWOT. 
2. What each document list as factors causing or not causing terrorism. 
3. What each document sees as solutions to the terrorist threat, short- or long-term 
 
The purpose of this analysis is to reveal major trends in the policy working behind the 
GWOT. 
 
4.1.1 The Nature of Terrorism 
 
The third chapter of the 2006 National Security Strategy (NSS2006) is titled “Strengthen 
Alliances to Defeat Global Terrorism and Work to Prevent Attacks against Us and Our 
Friends”221. The Chapter presents an overview of past events, failures and, successes 
pertaining to the GWOT. The most important successes in the past listed are the ousting of al-
Qaida from Afghanistan, the ongoing struggle against terrorists in Iraq, the dismantling al-
Qaida’s command structure (i.e. killing or capturing central characters), the rise of an 
international consensus to condemn terrorism as a means, and other positive developments. 
Listed failures (or challenges as the NSS puts it) are the transformation of terrorist 
organizations into a more elusive form, numerous destructive terrorist attacks around the 
globe, the use of the ongoing battle in Iraq as a propaganda tool by terrorist elements, and 
continued support from certain nations to terrorist elements. The NSS goes on to define the 
War on Terror (WOT) as an armed struggle and an ideological battle, as well as list the 
genesis of terrorism. The NSS is specific of the fact that the WOT is “a battle of ideas, it is 
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not a battle of religions.” The NSS is careful not to equate Islam with terrorism. Indeed, Islam 
is referred to as “the proud religion of Islam.” 222 
 
The QRD2006 defines terrorist organizations, or “global non-state terrorist networks” as it 
calls them, as “distributed multi-national and multi-ethnic networks”. According to the 
QRD2006 such terrorist networks are attacking the populations of the US and its allies in the 
GWOT to undermine their resolve to carry on the fight. Their ultimate goal is seen to be the 
establishment of a theocratic totalitarian order, spanning the entire Muslim world. The 
QRD2006 list a number of means terrorist networks use to perpetrate their acts of violence. 
According to the QRD2006 terrorist networks utilize the hallmarks of globalization, free 
movement of information, ideas, goods, services, capital, people, and technology, to carry out 
their attacks. Modern communications technology, cell phones, e-mail, twenty four hour news 
feeds, and the internet are readily used. One major objective for terrorist networks is to 
acquire weapons of mass destruction.223 
 
The QRD2006 sees the GWOT as a long war which is different from all earlier conflicts. This 
difference arises from three factors: the nature of the adversary the US faces the nature of the 
theater of war, and the means by which such a war can be won. The enemy differs from 
earlier wars because it is not a nation state, but dispersed non-state networks. War is not 
fought clearly is some country or along a border, but rather operations are executed globally 
and within the borders of nations the US is not necessarily at war with. The QRD 2006 also 
clearly states that the GWOT “…cannot be won by military force alone…”.224 
 
The NMS2004, being a wholeheartedly military document, does not try to define terrorism as 
such. Rather, it lists “Adversaries… from states to non-state organizations to individuals” that 
the US military faces. As far as terrorism is concerned the NMS2004 elaborates that some 
states sponsor terrorists by providing them sanctuary, financial resources, and other 
capabilities. Non-state actors and individuals also pose a threat.  According to the NMS2004 
these adversaries may be resistant or immune to traditional deterrence and capable of 
countering US power projection capabilities. These adversaries specifically target civilians, 
economic centers and, symbolic locations. The aim of these actions is to strike at the political 
will and resolve of the United States.225 
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The NSCT2006 closely echoes the tones and themes of the NSS2006. The NSCT2006, 
describes terrorist networks as having changed and evolved since the 9/11 -attacks as a result 
of counterterrorism efforts. According to the NSCT2006 the main adversary of the US in the 
GWOT is a “…transnational movement of extremist organizations, networks, and 
individuals…” This movement is backed by a number of state and non-state supporters and is 
animated by a twisted and violent interpretation of Islam.226  
 
The NSCT2006 stresses that the international terrorist movement is not a clear hierarchical 
organization, but rather collection of separate entities, which share the same general 
ideological framework.  The NSCT2006 calls this ideology an ideology of ”oppression, 
violence, and hate”. The aim of these violent extremists is to banish western powers from the 
Muslim world and set up totalitarian theocratic regimes based on a violent interpretation of 
Islam. The most radical elements within this movement, i.e. al-Qaida, aim even higher: to 
establish a pan-Islamic empire of global proportions. The goals are to be attained by 
exploiting controversies between the Muslim and non-Muslim world as well as within the 
Muslim world itself. This terrorist enemy does not discriminate when selecting targets and 
will strike at civilians without hesitation, and is constantly seeking weapons of mass 
destruction. The NSCT2006 also recognizes the existence of secular, limited terrorist 
networks not affiliated with radical Islam.227 
 
The NSCT2006 also describes the War on Terror and the United States’ strategy for it. The 
NSCT2006 describes the GWOT as a twofold battle, similarly to the NSS2006. The War on 
Terror is depicted to be an armed struggle as well as ideological battle, or rather” …a battle of 
arms and a battle of ideas… a fight against the terrorists and their murderous ideology”. The 
War itself can also be divided into to distinct sections or phases. In the short run the war will 
be fought utilizing “hard” anti-terrorism means, i.e. neutralizing terrorist operatives and their 
force multipliers. In the long run the battle will hinge on winning the ideological aspect of the 
war.228 
 
The NMSP-WOT sees the main terrorist threat in similar terms as the NSCT2006: 
“…extremist organizations, networks, and individuals… and their state and non-state 
supporters…”. The most important threat is the al-Qaida Associated Movement (AQAM). 
The AQAM consists of al-Qaida and other groups linked to it. Al-Qaida is no longer a 
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hierarchical organization but rather an global “extremist movement”, characterized by a 
highly adaptable cellular structure. This cellular structure is also characteristic of other 
terrorist networks, and is a great challenge to counter-terrorism efforts. The NMSP-WOT 
identifies nine basic components that are critical “elements of operation and survival” for 
terrorist networks. These are Leadership, Safe Havens, Finance, Communications, Movement, 
Intelligence, Weapons, Personnel, and Ideology. It is attacking these components that the 
NMSP-WOT sees as the way to undermine the terrorist networks center of gravity, i.e. 
remove the threat they pose. It is however recognized, that these components are not uniform 
and may vary a great deal.229 
 
The plan describes the GWOT in rather paradoxical term. It recognizes that the GWOT is 
being fought to protect the qualities of free and open societies. However, it simultaneously 
recognizes that it is these same qualities that enable terrorists capitalize on such traits of free 
societies as freedom of movement, communications, and financial systems, among others. 
Thus the plan concludes that because of this the US and its allies are vulnerable to attacks 
aimed at breaking the cohesion of the anti-terrorism coalition.230 
 
4.1.2 The Causes 
 
Of all the policy documents sighted above, in terms of identifying the roots and causes of 
terrorism, the NSS2006 offers the most explanations. Interestingly enough, the NSS2006 is 
equally adamant concerning what does not as well as concerning what does give rise to 
terrorism. The NSS separately elaborates four factors which it stresses do not give rise to 
terrorism. 231 
 
First, poverty does not inevitably breed terrorism. As proof of this, the NSS offers the fact 
that many of the 9/11 attackers were and Osama bin Laden is from rather well-to-do 
backgrounds. Second, terrorism is not solely a reaction to US actions in Iraq. That the 9/11-
attacks were carried out well before the US attacked Saddam Hussein’s regime underlines 
this. In addition countries which have not been involved in Operation Iraqi Freedom have 
never the less been targets of terrorist attacks. Third, terrorism is not solely a result of the 
Israeli-Palestinian conflict because planning for the 9/11-attacks “…began in the 1990s, 
during an active period in the peace process”. Fourth, nor is terrorism solely a reaction to 
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counter-terrorism efforts: “..al-Qaida… targeted the United States long before the United 
States targeted al-Qaida”.232  
 
After establishing what factors do not spawn terrorism, the NSS goes on to describe four 
factors that do. As the first explanation for the rise of terrorism the NSS2006 offers political 
alienation. Populations who are estranged from their governments and who lack opportunities 
and influence in their countries form abundant recruitment bases for terrorist networks. 
Second, past grievances which are perceived to rise from the actions of others are used as 
emotional rallying calls by terrorists. Here the NSS2006 would seem to be referring to some 
voices that have blamed several problems in the Muslim world on western colonialism, oil 
endeavors, and US actions during the Cold War233. 
 
Third, terrorist recruitment is made easier if the target population is misinformed or 
uninformed about world issues and the information that it does have is distorted by 
propaganda and conspiracy theories. Fourth, ultimately the success of terrorist networks 
hinges on the appeal of their ideology. This ideology is purposefully bolstered by clocking it 
an Islamic veil.234 
 
The root causes NSCT2006 gives for terrorism are nearly word to word identical to those 
presented in the NSS2006. The QRD2006, the NMS2004 and the NMSP-WOT do not, as 
such, provide any theoretical insight into the causes of terrorism. They do however identify 
key elements, or resources that terrorist networks need to operate and to survive, the most 
important of which is ideology (see “conditions” above).235 
 
It must be assumed that the NSS2006 (and NSS2002), as the superior policy document, 
dictates the assumptions on which the lower strategies and plans are based on. Interestingly 
enough, the National Security Strategy of the United States of America (2002, NSS 2002) 
differs from the NSS2006 on this matter. It does not list the causes of terrorism as does the 
NSS 2006, but rater it hints at “legitimate grievances”, and goes on to describe the GWOT in 
what are almost theological terms.236 
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4.1.2 The Solution 
 
All of the documents outline the means of winning the GWOT. They do this to a varying 
degree, and from different viewpoints: the NSS2006 may be seen to represent a grand 
strategic level, whilst the NSCT2006 / QRD2006 and the NMS2004 / the NMSP-WOT, 
roughly represent civilian  and military viewpoints, respectively. The NSS2006 outlines a 
dual pronged strategy: Immediate actions are aimed at killing or capturing terrorist operatives 
and disrupting or neutralizing their force multipliers. In the long run the GWOT is to be won 
by prevailing over the terrorists on an ideological battlefield, especially in the Muslim 
world.237  
 
This ideological battle is to be won by countering each of the causes the NSS2006 lists (see 
above). The strategy declares that the solution to terrorism is simple: democracy. This is so, 
because democracy, claims the NSS2006, provides a solution to each of the problems that 
give rise to terrorism. Democracy provides the population with ways to influence their 
country and their own future. Democracy promotes the rule of law, peaceful resolution of 
disputes and a culture of compromise. All factors that will alleviate felt grievances.  One of 
democracy’s carrying principles, freedom of speech as well as similar principles, will 
“vaccinate” populations against terrorist propaganda. Democracy will undermine terrorist 
ideology and targeting of civilians.238 
 
The NSS2006 recognizes that democracy will not however automatically destroy terrorism. It 
admits that groups exist within democratic societies which are unwilling or unable to embrace 
the benefits of democracy. These groups may form a recruitment base for terrorist networks 
within democratic societies. The solution to this problem is making democracy deeper and 
more inclusive. The ascension of oppressive regimes into democracy, however, is a long 
process. Because of this the NSS2006 also promotes four short-term solutions to terrorism. 
First, using a number of methods, attacks must be prevented before they occur. Terrorist die-
hards must be captured or killed. Terrorist networks must be disabled. Second, terrorist 
networks and rogue states supporting them, must be prevented from acquiring weapons of 
mass destruction. This is undoubtedly an allusion to Iran and possibly North Korea. Third, 
terrorists must be prevented from using rogue states as sanctuaries. The NSS2006 specifically 
mentions Syria and Iran. Fourth, the US must stop the terrorists from gaining control of a 
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strategic country in the Middle East, namely Afghanistan and Iraq, or “ungoverned areas”, 
and from using them as a base of operations.239 
 
The means to counter terrorism presented in the NSCT2006 are basically an elaboration on 
those presented in the NSS2006. The NSCT2006 briefly describes four similar short-term 
solutions as listed in the NSS2006. The plan, to a degree, focuses on these short-term 
solutions, although it does also dwell on long-term strategy.240   
 
Terrorist attacks will be prevented by attacking terrorist networks’ key assets. These include, 
leadership, foot soldiers (“terrorist NCOs” after a fashion), weaponry, financial resources, 
communication assets, and propaganda tools. In addition aviation-, maritime-, and border 
security will be upgraded to prevent terrorists from entering the US and hinder their 
movement internationally. Security protecting critical infrastructure elements will be 
enhanced.241   
 
Terrorist will be denied access to WMD/E242 –capabilities via a strategy composed of six 
simultaneous objectives. First, the United States will actively strive to form an accurate 
picture of the terrorist networks’ plans, objectives and capabilities concerning WMDs. 
Second, terrorists will be prevented from gaining WMD/E -related materials, and know-how 
by perpetrating a comprehensive international counter- and, non-proliferation strategy. Third, 
a deterrence strategy will be employed to thwart WMD/E -attacks. The NSCT2006 declares 
clearly that traditional forms of deterrence will not be adequate. It states that “Traditional 
threats may not work... We require a range of deterrence strategies that are tailored to the 
situation and the adversary”243.  However, it none the less describes deterrence in what sound 
like traditional Cold War jargon: “...terrorists… would face the prospect of an overwhelming 
response244 to any use of such weapons”. This deterrence will also include efforts to limit the 
effectiveness WMD/E –attacks in advance. Fourth, the United States will strike at the terrorist 
networks’ efforts to move WMD/E –materials. Fifth, the response to a WMD/E attacks will 
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be anticipatory in nature. Sixth, the United States will strive to anticipate, or after an attack, 
identify the source of the WMD/E –materials deployed by the terrorists.245 
 
State sponsorship of terrorist networks is especially troublesome, since some states that do 
sponsor terrorists most likely have the capacity to produce WMD/E. Terrorist will be cut off 
from the rogue states supporting and harboring them. This will be accomplished in two ways. 
First, the United States will work to end state sponsorship of terrorism. This will be carried 
out by maintaining sanctions against these states, by isolating them internationally. The 
NSCT2006 directly mentions five states that sponsor terrorism: Iran, Syria, Sudan, North 
Korea, and Cuba. Second, the United States will work to prevent the shipment of support, 
material or otherwise, from states to terrorist networks.246 
 
The strategy also aims to expel terrorist from areas, including what the NSCT2006 calls 
“ungoverned or under-governed areas” a clear allusion to failed states, which the terrorists are 
utilizing as bases of operation and sanctuary. Physical safe havens will be obliterated by 
helping ally states to gain complete control over their area. This possibly is a reference to 
countries like Yemen and Pakistan, which both have uncontrolled “tribal areas”, which 
possibly harbor Islamic terrorists 247. Failed states will be addressed by working to prevent 
conflict and respond to state failure by “…building foreign capacity for peace operations, 
reconstruction, and stabilization”248. In addition to physical sanctuaries, terrorist networks 
also utilize abstract non-physical, legal, or virtual safe havens. The United States will 
continue to help allied states in upgrading their legal framework to meet the challenges posed 
by international terrorism. In addition, terrorist financial operations will be attacked, and 
terrorist use of the internet will be answered to by promoting truthful information across the 
web.249 
 
The NSCT 2006 also addresses the long term strategies outlined in the NSS2006. It does this 
according to a slightly different terminology. The long term strategy to win the war is to 
create a “global environment” in which it is impossible for terrorist networks to survive. To 
succeed in the long term, the United States must work to uphold international standards and 
obligations concerning anti-terrorism. Anti-terror alliances and cooperation networks must be 
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strengthened. This includes organizations such as the International Maritime Organization as 
well as “alliances” such as the “coalition of willing and able states and organizations”. The 
United States must reform its governmental structure to better face terrorism, educate 
government officials in counter-terrorism and foster a “Culture of Preparedness” to aid in 
protecting the Homeland.250 
 
The long-term goal of the GWOT, according to the QRD2006 is to defeat the terrorists 
ideologically. This however requires that several major changes take place. An environment 
hostile to terrorism must be created on a global scale. Legitimate governments must be able to 
exert their authority over all their territories. Representative societies must arise around the 
globe to promote freedom (i.e. democracy), because freedom is the best ideological vaccine 
against terrorism. Terrorism must be ultimately beaten on ideological grounds.251 
 
The review stresses the fact that a combination of methods, military and non- military, will be 
required for the United States to triumph over terrorist networks. The path to victory is not 
littered with major battles and operations, but rather with numerous quiet successes 
accumulated over a long period of time, and achieved by means of intra-agency cooperation. 
Cooperation must also exist over national borders. International cooperation must be carried 
out within the NATO framework, as well as with countries which are not NATO members.252 
 
According to the QRD2006 is essential for the United States to keep to the offensive. Pressure 
must be kept on international terrorist networks by continually attacking them all around the 
globe. This requires several simultaneous, international operations of a long duration. These 
operations must often be perpetrated trough local forces, as this will help in the ideological 
battle. The QRD2006 lists several requirements that must be met, and also several capabilities 
which US forces must attain. While viewing Somalia as an area of operations the most 
important of these seems to be the call for knowledge of local conditions. The review declares 
that the battle most be brought to the enemy via “approaches that are tailored to local 
conditions and differentiated worldwide”.US forces must develop “Language and cultural 
awareness to facilitate the expansion of partner capacity”.253 
 
The NMS2004 outlines three military objectives to support the strategic objectives of the 
National Defense Strategy. To shield the United Sates from “external attacks and aggression”, 
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to “prevent conflict and surprise attack”, and to “prevail against adversaries”. The Homeland 
is to be protected by concentrating on defeating terrorism directly where it spawns, although 
anti-terrorism efforts within the US proper are not to be neglected. That is to say that the 
defense of the United States begins well abroad. Strategic approaches to the United States will 
be protected. This includes space approaches. The Military Strategy also promotes the 
importance of attacking the conditions which allow terrorist networks to survive and operate. 
The key to this is international cooperation to deny terrorists their state sponsors and prevent 
them from utilizing failed states as bases.254 
 
Conflicts and surprise attacks will be prevented by maintaining a comprehensive overseas 
presence. This presence will be utilized to demonstrate US resolve, support allies, deter 
aggression, and to strike pre-emptively when necessary. It the need arises US force will defeat 
adversaries, with or without help from its allies. These efforts will include major combat 
operations, smaller operations, as well as post-conflict- and stability operations.255   
 
The NMSP-WOT mostly follows the general structure and terminology of the US military’s 
Joint Operation Planning and Execution System (JOPES)256 format. Thus the strategic 
approach it proposes is described in terms of ends, ways, and means. The plan sees the role of 
the military as helping other government sectors in striking at the enemy’s centre of 
gravity257, its ideology. In step with this, “ends” are four termination objectives derived from 
national strategic objectives. The national objectives the NMSP-WOT describes are: the 
elimination of terrorism as a threat, the construction of a global environment that is 
inhospitable to terrorism, and the strengthening of the security abilities of partner nations in a 
number of ways. The termination objectives themselves are classified, but they are to be 
achieved by reaching six military strategic objectives. These six objectives are the “ways” of 
the military strategy for the GWOT. Below each one shall be discussed briefly.258 
 
Terrorists shall be denied the basic resources they require to operate and survive. This is to be 
achieved by utilizing the networked nature of terrorist organizations and the global links 
between them. In this way it will be possible to perpetrate attacks so as to cause effect 
throughout the linked networks. This will require assistance from partner nations. 
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Partner nations shall be empowered to counter terrorism. Success in the GWOT requires that 
anti-terrorism efforts are of a global, continuous nature. Because of this the United States 
must continue to foster regional partnerships to fight terrorism. 
 
 WMD/E –proliferation shall be countered in all its forms. In addition to preventing the mass 
destruction, this will prevent the rise of credibility terrorism would have in the eyes of 
potential supporters, should a WMD/E –attack succeed. This will be achieved by a number of 
ways, including non-proliferation (NP), counter-proliferation (CP), and consequence 
management (CM). 
 
Terrorists and their organizations will be defeated. Military operations will be executed to 
locate enemy functions. Once this is done senior leadership and operatives will be captured or 
killed.  Sanctuaries and bases will be attacked, terrorist cells neutralized, and training and 
recruitment operations shut down. This will be achieved in close cooperation with partner 
nations. 
 
Support for terrorists, by state or non-state actors, will be countered. State sponsors may 
provide terrorist networks with critical resources, the least of which is not legal cover and 
backing. Non-state supporter may provide terrorist networks with similar benefits as state 
supporter, including financial. Such support may be veiled as charity initiatives.  The military 
element of countering support consists of intelligence operations, attacks against terrorists and 
their supporters, as well as efforts to intercept the flow of resources from supporters to 
terrorist networks. Military action may include actions to topple or remove a regime which 
directly supports terrorists. 
 
The military will support the establishment of conditions that counter ideological support for 
terrorism. This is a critical objective since ideology is the terrorist enemy’s center of gravity. 
Military functions to this effect will include providing security and support  to the opponents 
of terrorist networks, and efforts to disrupt the ability of terrorist networks to convey their 
ideological messages. Operations and efforts will aim to isolate terrorist elements, which will 
turn global problem into local problems, which can then be then dealt with locally. Providing 
security is paramount, since security is required for success in other ideological and 
humanitarian operations. It is often best provided by training local and indigenous security 
forces. Thus it follows that contacts to the militaries of partner nations are vital. Humanitarian 
and information operations will support the ideological battle. 
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A critical element in the ideological battle is how operations are conducted. Botched or poorly 
conducted military operations may end up bolstering the terrorist’s ideological front. Potential 
ideological damage can be minimized by pursuing goals by means other than direct U.S. 
military actions. This basically means allowing indigenous forces to take the lead while US 
forces remain in a supporting role. When US forces do directly intervene, planning must be 
careful to minimize negative ideological effects, while at the same time showing that US 
forces cannot be defeated and will not hesitate to use force when necessary. Success in these 
goals requires knowledge of local culture and religious issues as well as knowledge of the 
tactics utilized by the local enemy. 
 
The NMSP-WOT does not go into detail concerning the means by which these objectives will 
be completed. It simply lists that the Combatant Commands, the Military Departments, the 
Combat Support Agencies, and Department of Defense (DoD) are the military means of 
fighting the GWOT. In an end note the NMSP-WOT goes on to once again stress the 
importance of cultural awareness: “We must be aware of the culture, customs, language and 
philosophy of affected populations and the enemy, to more effectively counter extremism, and 
encourage democracy, freedom, and economic prosperity abroad”.259 
 
4.2 The Global War on Terror: Operations in the Horn of Africa 
 
The United Sates’ effort in the Greater Horn of Africa region is not just a single operation. 
Not even to the extent most efforts in Iraq fall under Operation Iraqi freedom (OIF). Rather, 
US effort in the Horn consists of several different initiatives and operations.    
 
4.2.1 Forces 
 
US forces around the globe perpetrating operations, GWOT-related and otherwise, are 
divided into nine combatant commands. Five of these have a geographical area of 
responsibility (AOR). The are the US Northern Command (NORTHCOM), the US Southern 
Command (SOUTHCOM), the US European Command (EUCOM), the US Central 
Command (CENTCOM), and the US Pacific Command (PACOM). Together the AORs of 
these five geographic combatant commands (GCCs) circumvent the globe, and encompass all 
countries, including the continental United States. The other four combatant commands, have 
no geographical AOR, but have functional responsibilities. The combatant commands are the 
US Transportation Command (TRANSCOM), the US Special Operations Command 
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(SOCOM), the US Strategic Command (STRATCOM), and the US Joint Forces Command 
(JFCOM).260 
 
The combatant commands deter and repel attacks aimed at the United States, perform mission 
assigned to them, charge subordinate commands with missions and coordinate their actions,  
plan and execute operations, and uphold security. In addition GCCs are responsible for 
protecting of US citizens, providing liaison officers and military representatives to a number 
of agencies and a point of contact within their AOR, assessing and coordinating security 
matters with diplomatic missions, commanding US forces within their AOR, and exercising 
force protection among others tasks. While performing these tasks the GCCs report directly to 
the secretary of defense.261 
 
The GCC responsible for the greater horn region generally and Somalia specifically is 
CENTCOM. Of the African nations, Kenya, Somalia, Ethiopia, Eritrea, Djibouti, Egypt, and 
Sudan fall under CENTCOM jurisdiction. The rest of continental Africa belongs to EUCOM. 
Madagascar and several smaller islands fall under PACOM jurisdiction.  Thus Africa has 
been effectively been split between three different GCCs. This state of matters has created 
fault lines and seams between GCC boundaries which may possibly be capitalized on by 
terrorist networks to avoid detection. This however, is soon about to change radically. 262 
 
On February 6th 2007 President Bush announced the formation of a new GCC: US African 
Command (AFRICOM). AFRICOM’s AOR will encompass the whole of Africa, with the 
exception of Egypt, which will remain within CENTCOM’s AOR. The purpose behind the 
formation of AFRICOM is to provide a unity of command to all US military efforts in Africa. 
AFRICOM is to use this achieved unity to focus mainly on “humanitarian assistance, disaster 
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relief and crisis response missions”. AFRICOM is set to be operational by the end of 2008. 
Until then operation in the horn of Africa will remain under CENTCOM. 263  
 
Many of the details about AFRICOM, such as personnel issues, funding, and sites for possible 
bases, are still being worked out. As it is being constructed, AFRICOM’s role has already 
raised several questions. Will AFRICOM, once it is operational, really focus on humanitarian 
operations? What will be the amount of its actual military involvement in Africa? What will 
be AFRICOM’s role in counter-terrorism efforts and the GWOT?  These and similar 
questions are being raised as AFRICOM’s launching nears. Some African sates have already 
taken a negative stance toward the AFRICOM–to–be, and have declared that they will not 
host US troops or bases.264 However it is set up AFRICOM will most likely bring efficiency 
to US effort in Africa. 
 
The main US military component operating in the Horn of Africa is The Combined Joint Task 
Force - Horn of Africa (CJTF-HOA). Its strength personnel wise at any given time is 
approximately 1,800. This figure includes personnel from all military branches, civilians, and 
personnel from allied nations. CJTF-HOA is backed up by two other commands Commander 
Task Force – 150 (CTF-150), and a Joint Special Operations Task Force. CTF-150 is a naval 
force consisting of nine ships from seven countries.265 
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4.2.2 Operations 
 
CJTF-HOA’s AOR includes Djibouti, Ethiopia, Eritrea, Kenya, Sudan, Yemen, Somalia 
and the Seychelles. Comoros, Mauritius, and, Madagascar are coined “areas of interest”. 
Established in October 2002, CJTF-HOA originally operated from the US and from abroad  
USS MOUNT WHITNEY, until relocating to  Camp Lemonier, Djibouti in May 2003.266  
 
Since its initiation, CJTF-HOA has officially been mainly involved in development, support 
and humanitarian operations: Building schools, wells, clinics and hospitals, providing medical 
services and offering temporary veterinary clinic services. In addition to this CJTF-HOA has 
trained and assisted African security- and military forces. The aim of said training support is 
to “assist partner governments in building indigenous capacity to deny terrorists access to 
their territory”. Humanitarian actions mentioned above are to support this goal. Ultimately 
humanitarian operations are meant to “help discredit extremist propaganda and bolster local 
desires and capabilities to defeat terrorists”. I.e. win the “war of ideas”. Commander Task 
Force – 150 carries out maritime security operations in the Gulf of Oman, North Arabian Sea, 
parts of the Indian Ocean, Gulf of Aden, and the Red Sea. The objectives of these operations 
is to combat piracy and strike at terrorist networks’ transport capabilities between critical 
areas.267 
 
CJTF-HOA does, officially, operate in Somalia. All the humanitarian missions preformed by 
CJTF-HOA have been carried out within the Horn region, but outside Somali borders. CJTF-
HOA leadership has been very specific in proclaiming that their troops have not entered 
Somalia. In a news conference held September 21st then commander of CJTF-HOA,  Maj. 
Gen. Timothy Ghormley stated that: “We don't work in Somalia… We are -- we are not going 
into Somalia.  We are not in Mogadishu… I know that there's quite a bit of interest on it, on 
what's going on in Somalia.  But, no, sir, I am not pushing to get into Somalia.”.268 
 
If CJTF-HOA has not and does not operate in Somalia, what operations is the US then 
undertaking there? Since the only US operations in Somalia presently seem to be covert 
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operations, information is scarce. Basically the only information available is what can be 
gleaned from news reports and educated guesses performed by analysts. Vary little of what is 
presented below has been verified, so caution must be exercised. For clarity concerning 
sources, different claims are noted separately. However, as already stated above, what matters 
is not the exact operations and tactics, but rather, the nature of the US involvement in 
Somalia.   
 
Apparently, as terrorism awareness was on the rise in Washington in the aftermath of the 9/11 
–attacks, Somalia was perceived as a potential safe haven for terrorists. The wildest opinions 
even suggested that Osama bin Laden might flee to Somalia.269 This of course was in step 
with earlier American claims that bin Laden had visited Somalia several times before270. US 
reconnaissance in Somalia was activated. This included military as well as civilian (CIA) 
operations.271 Allegations of connections between al Qaida and Somali Islamic groups and 
certain warlords were soon to follow272. The US began to be active toward warlords perceived 
to be potential allies in the fight against islamist terrorist networks273. The US began backing 
some of the warlords in an effort to counter rising islamist power in Somalia274. Claims were 
made that US Marines from CJTF-HOA were performing anti terror functions within 
Somalia, but these claims were refuted by CJTF-HOA leadership275. Some reports claimed 
that the US was perpetrating or at least making preparations to execute covert anti-terror 
operations in Somalia trough proxy private military companies (PMC).276 
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Whatever the extent of US operations in Somalia after 9/11, it remains that the US was active 
when it came to anti-terrorism. Actions seem to have consisted of recruiting local militias and 
warlords to survey and capture terror suspects. This state of matter changed dramatically once 
the UIC captured Mogadishu and large parts of Somalia proper. Seemingly the US, despite 
claims to the contrary, heavily backed the TFG and Ethiopian forces while simultaneously 
perpetrating man-hunts to apprehend or kill al-Qaida affiliates. The most dramatic operations 
were several aerial bombardments in January 2007 aimed at terror suspect. Claims have been 
maid that several US soldiers and marines would have been taken captive by the Islamic 
militias and exchanged for UIC leadership taken captive. Such claims have been denied by 
US officials. 277  
 
It is thus apparent that the US has carried out several operations in Somalia of an anti-
terrorist-nature. That is to say that in its present counter-terrorism efforts in Somalia the US 
has reverted to rather “hard” methods; assassinating or apprehending suspects  and using 
military means to thwart terrorists’ efforts to operate, possibly through proxy forces. It seems 
that the hunt for al-Qaida operatives in Somalia is being executed with little regard for 
minimizing collateral damages or the US’s public image in Muslim Somalia, as air destructive 
air strikes were renewed in March 2008.278 
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5. Conclusions 
 
Is Somalia a threat to US security and GWOT-objectives? Does Somalia really hold potential 
as a terrorist base of operations or a recruiting- or staging area? To answer these questions, 
above I have analyzed Somalia and its relevant attributes. 
 
5.1 Somalia 
 
As Menkhaus has aptly pointed out279, Somalia seems at first glance to be a very promising 
target for terrorist operations. Its long unguarded borders and coastline, its close ties with, and 
close proximity to, the Arab world, and its lack of central government all make it sound like a 
virtual terrorist’s godsend. Menkhaus argues though that Somalia is everything but the perfect 
terrorist safe haven. Close analysis reveals that conditions of state collapse are far from ideal 
conditions for terrorist networks. Menkhaus’s conclusions are easy to agree with. 
 
Historical and anthropological study of the Somali people reveals some clues into how 
Somalia should be perceived in terms of the GWOT. When viewing the history of, and social 
constructions in, modern Somalia, one can see that several trends and phenomenon which are 
visible to the present-day observer date far back into history. Some, such as the undeniable 
significance of the clan system, may even date back to the primordial genesis of the Somali 
people. For the sake of our present discussion, four points of significance can be pointed out. 
 
First, regional divisions, particularly a North-South division, run across Somalia. Somalia is 
not a homogenous country, even if the Somali share a cultural background that is surprisingly 
homogenous in an African context. Great differences exist between and within Somalia’s 
different regions. For example, as shown above, historical developments have been very 
different in northern and southern Somalia throughout their history. It is clearly no 
coincidence that to date northern Somalia has developed into the relatively stable and 
somewhat peaceful Somaliland, while southern Somalia has yet again been enflamed into 
chaos and civil war. The Majerteen Puntland is exception in itself.  
 
Somalia’s diversity will severely hinder the efforts of terrorist networks. For example, 
successful transportation operations from Yemen to northern Kenya will have to traverse 
multiple areas controlled by different factions, factions possessing of a varying amount of 
incentives for cooperation. In addition terrorist networks wishing to find safe haven in 
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Somalia are thus forced to work with several different regional authorities, increasing the 
possibility of betrayal. 
 
Any counterterrorism strategy that wishes to be successful in the long run is also going to 
have to address these regional differences. They will have to be taken into account while 
planning operations in Somalia, “hard” counterterrorism operations as well “soft” 
humanitarian operations. All in all, any conditions prevailing in any given part of the Somali 
nation can not be assumed to be valid elsewhere. Adding to this confusion, these conditions 
are likely to change, sometimes rapidly. 
 
Second, clan affiliations are overwhelmingly important. As is obvious from the above, clan is 
a controversial, complex, labile, variable, and nearly omnipresent phenomenon in modern 
Somalia. It may have somewhat dwindled in public visibility during the Barre years. 
However, the clan system was the institution people looked to in the chaos created by the 
collapse of central government. Indeed, a closer look at the Barre years reveals that the clan 
system remained a fundamental building block of Somali society, only its role and function 
were slightly different in flavor. 
 
While one must resist the temptation to oversimplify the role of clan in modern Somalia, its 
importance is certainly hard to overestimate. Clan undercuts everything. The clan system 
certainly complicates matters for terrorist networks wishing to operate from, through, or 
within Somalia. Even an Islamist Jihad fails to dispel the significance of the clan. A good 
example of this is the problems the AIAI encountered while administrating the town of Luuq 
(see above). There is no reason why that the ICU, or al-Qaida for that matter, would have, in 
the long run, fared any better.  
 
Somali history has time and again shown that clan and intra-clan alliances and rivalries can 
change very rapidly according to the situation at hand. Islamist allies of today could tomorrow 
just as easily fight terrorist networks in hopes of claiming monetary rewards so lavishly 
handed out by the US. Terrorist networks operating in Somalia would most likely get caught 
up in struggles between and within clans and clan based factions. This would force terrorist 
networks to confront the “Luuq-dilemma” the AIAI faced in the 1990’s. Eventually the 
terrorist networks would become just another faction and a party to the civil war. Just as 
happened to the ill-fated UNOSOMs. The same trap however not only awaits Islamic 
terrorists, but also western anti-terrorism efforts. To some extent the US has already fallen 
into this trap.  
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Third, the power of Islam in Somalia in strong, and Arabic connections are robust. Somalia 
has throughout its history been, and to date remains culturally strongly connected to the 
Arabic world. Even though the predominant form of Islam in Somalia is Sufism, not 
Wahhabism as in Saudi Arabia, Arabic influences are considerable. Ideas and ideologies, even 
Islamist ones, are easily transported to the Horn of Africa from Arabia and the Gulf states. 
This is evident from the original arrival of Islam to Somalia, or on a more modern note, the 
arrival of political Islam during the Barre years. Connections between Somalia and the Arabic 
world can thus be assumed to help terrorist networks spread its ideology, form contacts and 
recruit personnel. 
 
Fourth, the Somali diaspora holds a great deal of indirect and consequential potential. Large 
amounts of Somali dwell outside Somalia’s borders. Somalia’s history is rife with examples 
of how these expatriates have influenced Somali politics. Clearly the most important group 
has been the large Somali population in Ethiopia’s Ogaden region. Were if not for the threat 
Ethiopia sees in the Ogaden Somali, it most probably would not have intervened in Somalia in 
the way it has. It is reasonable to assume that this trend will continue, and the Somali 
populations in Ethiopia, Kenya, and Djibouti will continue to be a factor in regional politics. 
In addition to the considerably large populations living in neighboring countries, the parts of 
the diaspora living in the Arab and Gulf states as well as the west, will remain a factor in the 
complex equation that is Somali politics. It is possible, if however unlikely, that diaspora 
members in the west may be recruited by terrorist networks. As many already possess the 
nationality of their host country, and are second or third generation refugees, they may remain 
under the security services “radar”. 
 
To assess Somalia’s terrorist potential, it is necessary to establish what is the role and 
potential of radical Islam in Somali society. As demonstrated above, radical or political Islam, 
Islamism is a very multi-faceted phenomenon in Somalia. A heterogeneous multitude of 
different Islamic groups operate in present day Somalia, of which radical Islamists likely to 
cooperate enthusiastically with al-Qaida are a small minority. Many of these majority groups 
are Sufi in orientation, and genuinely seek to advance their goals with peaceful means. At 
least this was the case before the ill fated Ethiopian invasion in the end of 2006. 
 
It is possible that the Ethiopian invasion already has or will radicalize formerly moderate 
Islamist factions, and thus provide al-Qaida and other terrorist networks with potential 
recruits and supporters. It is clear from Somali history that a radical Islamic cause is, in the 
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long run, unable to unify Somalis and mobilize large scale support. A common enemy 
however is a different matter entirely. Whether it was British colonial rule during Muhammad 
Abdullah Hassan’s revolt, Ethiopians during the Ogaden war, or the Barre regime during the 
beginning of the civil war, a common enemy has been much more successful in uniting the 
clans. The same thing may eventually happen with the present Ethiopian invasion. 
 
What seems to have happened is that Islamist movements have been able to “hijack” Somali 
nationalism, which has, paradoxically in clan centered Somalia, a much more powerful allure 
than political Islam. Radical Islamists, such as Shabaab, have been able to portray themselves 
as fighting for the Somali nation, albeit an Islamist version of it. In addition they have been 
able to depict the TFG as an Ethiopian puppet. 
 
Another, possibility sighted by several researchers, Bjørn Møller among them, is that a strong 
connection could be forged between an Islamist faction and a specific clan or clan-family. 
This is easy to agree with. A similar connection as existed and to some degree still exists 
between the Taleban and the Pashtuns of Afghanistan. This is possible if Islamist interest of 
fighting Ethiopians and the TFG are identified with Hawiye interests of resisting the Daarood 
dominated TFG’s power. Such a connection seems already to exist to some extent. If this state 
of matters develops further Islamist factions might be able to equate their survival with 
Hawiye survival, and thus solicit considerable support from the Hawiye, which are powerful 
in the Mogadishu area. This might potentially lead to increasing, at least momentary, support 
for foreign terrorist networks. This in turn could potentially hinder peace initiatives, 
humanitarian efforts, and US counterterrorism efforts. It is one thing to take up a small 
Islamic faction, but another thing entirely to take on a powerful clan-family on its home 
ground. The Black Hawk Down-tragedy remains a painful remainder of this.  
 
So does Somalia hold potential as a terrorist base of operations or a recruiting- or staging 
area? All in all it seems that Somalia’s immediate potential as a terrorist base of operations or 
a recruiting- or staging area in not very great. This is due to cultural factors and the 
circumstances of state collapse, such vicious and tangled webs of clan conflict. However, 
while Somalia does not hold immediate “terrorist potential”, it is possible that in the future it 
could claim a more central role in the field of international terrorism. 
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5.2 The Global War on Terror in the Horn of Africa 
 
Ever since the 9/11 –attacks, The United States has been fighting its Global War on Terror to 
promote US interests and security. The United States’ general strategy and policies for this 
war has here been derived from several different policy documents of different levels. 
Discussed in chapter 4.1, an analysis of said policy documents is attempted by looking at all 
of the documents in turn through three questions concerning the definition and causes of as 
well as a solution to terrorism. Analysis is also performed on how these documents describe 
the GWOT. 
  
The documents define terrorism in very broad terms. Very few specific definitions are given, 
and one might even say that the definitions given for terrorism and terrorist networks are 
“conveniently” vague. Terrorist networks are described as being international, elusive, 
capable of adapting, and skilful in exploiting the vulnerabilities of open western societies. All 
in all terrorist networks are seen as unconventional yet potentially dangerous foes.  
 
Most of the documents do not deal with the causes behind terrorism. As stated above the 
NSS2006 also lists four factors which are not the sole causes of terrorism: poverty, the war in 
Iraq, the Israli-Palestinian conflict, and US counterterrorism efforts. Poverty certainly is 
present in Somalia, as well as is awareness about the conflicts in Iraq and Palestine. As stated 
above US and Ethiopian counter-terrorism efforts may actually have aggravated the terrorism 
situation in Somalia, at least in the long run. 
 
The four factors the NSS2006 describes to cause terrorism are certainly at work in Somalia. 
Large segments of the population are certainly politically alienated, as there is no state 
system, and traditional clan administrations have left the members of small, weak, and 
unarmed clans at a considerable disadvantage. Grievances can be found in Somalia. Crimes 
committed during the Barre years as well as those perpetrated during the civil war, are well 
remembered. This also goes for the United States. Many remember the UNITAF and the 
UNOSOMs in negative tones. Misinformation is also abundant in Somalia as all the different 
factions have spred their versions of the truth through different medias, including the internet 
and radio networks.  
 
The most important cause behind terrorism, according to the NSS2006, is terrorist ideology. 
On this point Somalia in not so clearly defined as with concerning the earlier three causes. As 
mentioned above, to the Somali radical Islamism is something foreign and non-Somali. The 
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ideological allure of radical political Islam is not that great. However, even if the population 
generally does not ascribe to the terrorists’ ideology, small groups of individuals do. All in all, 
in terms of the NSS2006, Somalia is not the optimum area of operations for terrorist 
networks, but it certainly does hold potential. 
 
The strategy for countering the threat posed by terrorism, as presented in the aforementioned 
documents, is definitely a dual strategy. Dual, for it is composed of short-term as well as 
long-term objectives. In the short term the strategies stressed “hard” methods such as 
capturing and killing terrorists, disrupting their networks, and denying them access to 
weapons of mass destruction. In the long term the strategies stressed “soft”, possibly non-
military methods, and defeating terrorist networks ideologically, the ultimate goal being the 
spread of democracy. 
 
However, while US anti-terrorism strategies stress the importance of softer humanitarian 
actions and the ideological battle, the actual actions the US has undertaken in Somalia are 
mostly of the harder military variety. It seems that US actions are in contradiction with overall 
US strategies. US counter-terrorism strategies call for winning the ideological battle, 
humanitarian efforts (such as CJTF-HOA has been undertaking elsewhere in the Horn), and 
the advancement of democracy. US operations in Somalia have however focused on 
apprehending and neutralizing a few terrorism suspects, regardless of the costs. “Collateral 
damages” caused by US counter-terrorism operations, such as the air-strikes in January 2007, 
have seriously hindered US efforts in the grand ideological battle being fought for the hearts 
and mind of moderate Muslims in Somalia and elsewhere. Ideologically, being seen as a 
strong backer of the Daarood-dominated and Ethiopian backed TFG has been just as 
devastating as civilian casualties.  It would seem that short term gain has been pursued at 
grave cost to long term success. 
 
Taking the above into account is the US response then adequate to the threat Somalia poses in 
terms of radical Islamic terror? The US’s activity in Somalia clearly demonstrates that the US 
takes the “Somali threat” very seriously. Clearly a great amount of resources, military and 
otherwise, have been poured into the Horn of Africa and surrounding areas. The contribution 
of even such a numerically relatively small force as CJTF-HOA is significant in a situation in 
which the US is engaged in several other larger operations, such as Operation Enduring 
Freedom – Afghanistan, and Operation Iraqi Freedom. The ending of the division of Africa 
between three different combatant commands and the establishment of AFRICOM underline 
this point. The US clearly recognizes Africa’s growing geopolitical importance.  
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Thus it is clear that Africa generally and Somalia specifically are viewed as important. In such 
terms the US response to the “Somali threat” is clearly adequate. However, the problem lies 
in not the amount of resources allocated to the GWOT in Somalia, bur rather in the nature of 
the US engagement there. Focusing mostly on short term “hard” operations has clearly 
damaged the US’s long term interests in Somalia.  While it is not certain that the insurgency 
in Somalia will develop into an quagmire resembling Iraq, what is certain is that since the 
September 11th attacks Somalia has moved farther from and not closer to peace. This is 
partially a result of US counterterrorism policies in Somalia. 
 
5.3 Critique and the Need for Further Study 
 
The above conclusions have been reached by studying a very broad range of subjects and 
topics. Thus as the overall subject has been fairly broad, each individual topic has not been 
delved as deeply as would be preferable. Indeed, the topics touched upon in chapters three and 
four are broad enough to fill several studies on their own.  
 
Certainly understanding the military ramifications of Somali cultural institutions requires 
additional study. It of course goes without saying that building this kind of cultural awareness 
is highly necessary in today’s western militaries. Militaries, which are engaged in increasingly 
challenging operations in which demarcation lines between combatants and non-combatants 
or war and peace, are extremely blurred. 
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6. Finnish Summary 
 
Terrorisminvastainen sota Afrikan sarvessa 
 
Siitä asti kun Siad Barren diktatuuri kaatui 1990-luvun alussa, Somalia on ollut vailla 
toimivaa keskusvaltaa. Toisin sanoen Somalia on ollut totaalista anarkiaa muistuttavassa 
tilassa lähes kaksi vuosikymmentä. Näiden kaoottisten olojen on usein nähty lisäävän 
terroristijärjestöjen mahdollisuuksia hyödyntää Somaliaa tuki- ja operaatioalueena. 
Vastauksena tähän uhkaan Yhdysvallat on toimeenpannut useita terrorisminvastaisia 
operaatioita ja aloitteita Afrikan sarvessa ja erityisesti Somaliassa. 
 
Tässä tutkimuksessa tutkittiin terrorisminvastaista sotaa Somaliassa kaksijakoisella 
analyysillä. Ensiksi analysoitiin Somalian nykytilannetta ja historiaa, jotta saataisiin käsitys 
Somalia muodostamasta uhasta terrorisminvastaisessa sodassa. Toiseksi tutkittiin 
Yhdysvaltain terrorisminvastaisia strategioita ja operaatioita, jotta voitaisiin vastata itse 
päätutkimusongelmaan: Vastaavatko Yhdysvaltain vastatoimet siihen uhkaan, jonka 
islamilainen terrorismi Somaliassa muodostaa? 
 
Materiaalina tutkimuksessa käytettiin Somaliaa käsitteleviä antropologisia, poliittisia ja 
turvallisuuspoliittisia tutkimuksia ja artikkeleita. Näitä lähteitä täydennettiin eri uutislähteistä 
saaduilla reportaaseilla. Tähän tarkoitukseen käytettiin niin ei-länsimaisia kuin länsimaisiakin 
uutispalveluita. Yhdysvaltojen terrorisminvastaisia strategioita edustamaan valittiin joukko 
erilaisia ja -tasoisia poliittisia ja sotilaallisia asiakirjoja. 
 
Somaliassa monilla sosiaalisilla instituutioilla, kuten klaanijärjestelmällä, on keskeinen rooli. 
Tästä syystä Somalia on terroristijärjestöille varsin haasteellinen toimintaympäristö. 
Haasteellisuutta lisäävät entisestään eri somaliryhmittymien keskinäisten suhteiden jatkuva 
muutoksen tila ja monimutkainen sisällissotaa muistuttava sisäpoliittinen tilanne. Näin ollen 
Somalian laajamittainen hyödyntäminen on ulkomaisille terroristijärjestöille, kuten al-
Qaidalle, erittäin vaikeaa lähes totaalisesta keskusvallan puutteesta huolimatta.   
 
Yhdysvallat on ottanut terrorismin uhan Afrikassa ja Somaliassa erittäin vakavasti. Sen 
terrorisminvastaiset operaatiot Somaliassa ovat keskittyneet lähinnä terroristiepäiltyjen kiinni 
saamiseen tai neutraloimiseen. Tämänsuuntainen politiikka yhdistettynä Etiopian Somalian 
valloituksen tukemiseen on kuitenkin saattanut entisestään lisätä Somalian 
terrorismipotentiaalia.  
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